Liable for Your Lies: Misrepresentation Law as a Mechanism for Regulating Behavior on Social Networking Sites by Fahimy, Geelan
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 2 Article 3
1-15-2012
Liable for Your Lies: Misrepresentation Law as a
Mechanism for Regulating Behavior on Social
Networking Sites
Geelan Fahimy
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law
Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geelan Fahimy Liable for Your Lies: Misrepresentation Law as a Mechanism for Regulating Behavior on Social Networking Sites, 39 Pepp. L.
Rev. 2 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/3
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012 3:18 PM 
 
367 
Liable for Your Lies: 
Misrepresentation Law as a 
Mechanism for Regulating Behavior 
on Social Networking Sites 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
II.   THE MANY FACES OF MISREPRESENTATION LAW AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
A.   Misrepresentation Law 
1.   Tortious Misrepresentation 
i. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
ii. Negligent Misrepresentation 
2.   Criminal Misrepresentation 
B.   Deceit in a Networked World 
1.   The Rise of Social Networking Sites 
2.  The Prevalence of Misrepresentations in an 
Interconnected Society 
III.   LYING TO THE ONLINE COMMUNITY: THE APPLICABILITY OF 
MISREPRESENTATION ACTIONS 
A.   Is It a Tort to Lie on Your Social Networking Profile? 
1.   Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
i. Misrepresentation 
ii. Knowledge of Falsity 
iii. Intent to Induce 
iv. Justifiable Reliance 
v. Damages 
2.   Negligent Misrepresentation 
i. Doe v. MySpace, Inc.: A Model for Future 
Negligent Misrepresentation Actions 
ii. Negligent Online Speech Causing Physical Harm 
B.   Is It a Crime to Lie on Your Social Networking Profile? 
1.   Revisiting United States v. Drew and the Case of 
Elizabeth Thrasher 
i. United States v. Drew 
ii. The Case of Elizabeth Thrasher 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:18 PM 
 
368 
2.   Predicting the Outcome of Full Sail, Inc. v. Does 
IV.   THE FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING 
MISREPRESENTATION LAW TO MISREPRESENTATIONS ON SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES 
A.   Does Regulating Online Behavior Hinder Free Speech 
Rights? 
B.   Is Misrepresentation Law Necessary to Manage Fraud  
 on Social Networks? 
V.   CONCLUSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 18, 2007, a fourteen-year-old eighth grader created a fake 
MySpace profile depicting her middle school principal, James McGonigle.1  
The profile included a picture of the principal and suggested that he was a 
pedophile and sex addict—the profile address was titled “‘kids rock my 
bed.’”2  The principal was also described “as a forty year old, married, 
bisexual man living in Alabama.”3  In the interests section of the profile, his 
interests were listed as: “‘detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, 
spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my golden 
pen, fucking in my office, [and] hitting on students and their parents.’”4  
Further outlandish, crude, and false statements described the principal as a 
“‘hairy, expressionless, sex addict, fa[t] ass.’”5  In one part of the profile, the 
“principal” purportedly wrote the following about himself: 
[I have come to MySpace] so I can pervert the minds of other 
principals to be just like me.  I know, I know, you’re all thrilled.  
Another reason I came to [MySpace] is because I am keeping an 
eye on you students who I care for so much . . . . For those who 
want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school, I love children, sex 
(any kind), dogs[,] long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head 
and last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man . . . [S]o 
please feel free to add me, message me[,] whatever.6 
As a result of this fraudulent MySpace profile, the student was 
suspended from school for ten days.7  The student responded by filing a 
 
 1.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07CV585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 2.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 6.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 7.  Id. at *2. 
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lawsuit and claiming that the suspension violated her First Amendment free 
speech rights.8 
This case illustrates one of the many ways in which misrepresentations 
take place on social networking sites and how people use these sites to 
engage in abusive and deceitful conduct.9  More importantly, this case 
presents several crucial questions that will be central to future litigation 
involving social networking sites: Can misrepresentation law serve as a 
mechanism for regulating dishonesty on these websites?10  Specifically, can 
deceitful statements on social networking sites constitute a 
“misrepresentation” under tort law?11  Are there instances where these 
misrepresentations can be criminal?12  Finally, would the application of 
misrepresentation law infringe on a social network user’s First Amendment 
free speech rights?13 
This Comment emphasizes that the growth of social networking sites 
has far surpassed cyberspace governance and the development of rules 
regulating the use of these websites.14  Thus, courts should refine their 
approach to misrepresentation law to adequately address the challenges 
posed by social networking sites.15  This Comment argues that courts should 
apply misrepresentation law to online deceit and adopt a balancing test that 
considers a totality of the circumstances—free speech implications and the 
egregiousness of the lie—in deciding whether tort liability or criminal 
penalties are appropriate.16 
Part II of this Comment presents an overview of misrepresentation law 
and the rise of social networking sites.17  Part II also discusses the various 
motives for lying and the ways in which misrepresentations can occur on 
social networking sites.18  Part III analyzes whether misrepresentation law is 
an appropriate mechanism for regulating behavior on social networking 
 
 8.  Id. at *3.  For further free speech cases relevant to fake online profiles, see infra Part IV.A. 
 9.  See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
 11.  See infra Part III.A. 
 12.  See infra Part III.B. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 14.  See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical 
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 80 (2003) (“[T]ort law continues to lag behind the 
technological dilemmas created by an increasingly networked society.”). 
 15.  See infra notes 372–74 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See infra notes 364–74 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
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sites.19  Part IV discusses the free speech implications of imposing 
misrepresentation liability and argues that the application of 
misrepresentation law is appropriate in limited circumstances.20  Part V 
concludes.21 
II.  THE MANY FACES OF MISREPRESENTATION LAW AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
A.  Misrepresentation Law 
Misrepresentation law is a complex subject that crosses many areas of 
law.22  As such, misrepresentation claims can arise in both civil and criminal 
cases by means of a common law claim23 or under a particular statute.24  
Depending on whether a given case is prosecuted criminally or civilly, the 
elements of the cause of action will vary.25  Two of the main areas that 
misrepresentation law covers are tortious misrepresentations and criminal 
misrepresentations.26 
1.  Tortious Misrepresentation 
In tort law, three types of misrepresentation are actionable27—willful, 
negligent, and innocent.28  Liability in tort for misrepresentation is further 
 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part IV. 
 21.  See infra Part V. 
 22.  VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 1022–23 (11th ed. 
2005) (emphasizing that the numerous available remedies for misrepresentation render this area of 
the law difficult and complex); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
684 (4th ed. 1971) (recognizing a further complication where “misrepresentation has been merged to 
such an extent with other kinds of misconduct that [in certain circumstances] neither the courts nor 
legal writers have found any occasion to regard it as a separate basis of liability”). 
 23.  See infra text accompanying notes 27–75. 
 24.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1994) (making it illegal for any person, partnership, or corporation 
to disseminate false advertisements “[b]y any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely 
to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in or having an effect upon commerce, of food, drugs, 
devices, services, or cosmetics”); 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2004) (regulating unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices by making it unlawful for an athletic agent to “recruit or solicit a student athlete” by 
“giving any false or misleading information or making a false promise or representation”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252C(b) (2006) (imposing a fine and prison sentence of up to twenty years on one who 
“knowingly embeds words or digital images into the source code of a website with the intent to 
deceive a minor into viewing material harmful to minors on the Internet”). 
 25.  See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 26.  Although misrepresentation law also encompasses misrepresentations made in the context of 
contracts, the scope of this paper does not address contract law. 
 27.  Alfred Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 684 (1973).  
Generally, tort law, and specifically the tort of misrepresentation, is an area of state law.  See, e.g., 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 2010) (“One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him 
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distinguished according to whether the resulting harm is economic or 
physical.29  Although the tort of misrepresentation usually involves an 
interest in being free from economic loss due to the false statements of 
another person,30 there can also be liability for non-economic losses, such as 
physical injury or emotional distress.31  Consequently, a person harmed by 
another’s deceit can seek legal redress in a civil case for pecuniary or 
physical damage by relying on a tort32 cause of action for 
misrepresentation.33  The standard of liability depends upon whether the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent, negligent, or innocent. 
 
to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”).  But 
see Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 432, 448–63 (1996) (describing the constitutional grounds for federal 
involvement in tort law and presenting public policy reasons favoring federal involvement in certain 
areas of tort law). 
 28.  This Comment will address fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations. 
 29.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (codifying liability for pecuniary 
loss caused by fraudulent misrepresentation), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) 
(summarizing liability for pecuniary loss caused by negligent misrepresentation), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965) (discussing conscious misrepresentation involving 
risk of physical harm), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) (codifying liability for 
negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm). 
 30.  SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 1022. 
 31.  See, e.g., Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 480, 485 
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (“Ohio law permits the recovery of punitive or nonpecuniary damages for 
intentional, willful, and wanton acts, or by malice inferred from conduct and surrounding 
circumstances.”); Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 867–68 (Alaska 1999) (finding that 
emotional distress damages are recoverable for the tort of misrepresentation where the emotional 
distress is “severe”); Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 523 P.2d 662, 671–72 (Cal. 1974) (finding 
that store owner could recover damages for behavior that annoyed him in an action for fraud); Allen 
v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that mental distress damages could be 
recovered where the allegations of wrongdoing are specific); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 
484–85 (Conn. 1991) (allowing recovery for emotional distress in a misrepresentation action); 
McRae v. Bolstad, 646 P.2d 771, 775 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that mental suffering damages 
were compensable in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation where the mental suffering is 
manifested by “objective symptoms”); see also Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress 
in Fraud Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) 
(arguing that the distinction between personal and commercial torts is unrealistic in a “modern 
consumer society” and that various public policy factors weigh in favor of recognizing fraud as a 
dignitary tort and awarding emotional distress damages).  See generally Steven J. Gaynor, 
Annotation, Fraud Actions: Right to Recover for Mental or Emotional Distress, 11 A.L.R.5TH 88 
(1993). 
 32.  SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 (“‘Tort’ comes from the Latin word ‘tortus,’ which 
means twisted, and the French word ‘tort,’ which means injury or wrong.  A tort is a civil wrong, 
other than a breach of contract, for which the law provides a remedy.”). 
 33.  Such an action has often been linked to the common law action of deceit.  Laura Barke, 
When What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Third Party Liability for Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
in Non-Commercial Settings After Doe v. Dilling, 888 N.E.2d 24, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 201, 203 (2009).  
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i. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
As codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there are two types of 
fraudulent misrepresentation—one that causes economic harm34 and one that 
causes physical harm.35  In defining the former, section 525 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, 
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to 
refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the 
other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable 
reliance upon the misrepresentation.36 
Accordingly, the prima facie case for fraudulent misrepresentation 
includes: (1) a false representation; (2) intent to induce reliance; (3) 
justifiable reliance; and (4) damages.37  In this context, a “misrepresentation” 
not only includes written and spoken words, but it also encompasses “any 
other conduct that amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the 
truth.”38  In other words, it is a misrepresentation when words or conduct 
assert the existence of a fact that does not really exist.39 
Generally, in order for the misrepresentation to be of a fraudulent 
character, the maker must “know[] or believe[] that the matter is not as he 
represents it to be.”40  The misrepresentation can also, however, be 
fraudulent in two other circumstances: (1) where the maker “does not have 
 
Before the eighteenth century, the tort of deceit was limited to contractual relationships.  Id.  Today, 
however, it is not necessary for there to be a contractual dealing between the parties in order to bring 
a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.  Id.; see also Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial 
Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1017, 1018 (2003) (distinguishing how materiality is a required element to recover damages in 
tort for misrepresentation, but not to obtain rescission in contracts law). 
 34.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 35.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965). 
 36.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1022 
(8th ed. 2004) (defining fraudulent misrepresentation as “a false statement that is known to be false 
or is made recklessly without knowing or caring whether it is true or false and that is intended to 
induce a party to detrimentally rely on it”). 
 37.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 38.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b (1977) (emphasis added). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977); see also Bergeron v. Ridgewood Sec. 
Corp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118, 143 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding that the defendants knew their 
statements about planning a $500 million initial public offering were false given the fact that they 
made the statements “despite knowing that no feasibility study had been conducted and that little if 
any work had been done”); Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. BK Int’l Ins. Brokers, Ltd., 490 F. Supp. 2d 
556, 563 (D.N.J. 2007) (granting a seller’s motion to dismiss where the prospective purchaser of a 
corporation failed to allege facts to establish that the seller’s statements were knowingly false); 
Parker v. Fla. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Fla. State Univ., 724 So. 2d 163, 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(interpreting the scienter requirement of fraudulent misrepresentation to require bad faith). 
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the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or 
implies,” or (2) where the maker “knows that he does not have the basis for 
his representation that he states or implies.”41  Fraudulent misrepresentations 
may include ambiguous representations capable of two interpretations,42 
materially misleading representations which are incomplete and do not state 
“additional or qualifying matter,”43 and representations of intention where 
the maker does not in fact have the intent represented.44 
As to the second requirement, that the misrepresentation be made to 
induce another to act, the maker of the misrepresentation may be liable not 
only to the person he intends to induce to act or refrain from acting, but also 
to any person he “has reason to expect”45 to act or refrain from acting.46  As 
 
 41.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). 
 42.  See, e.g., BP Amoco Chem. Co. v. Flint Hills Res., LLC, 600 F. Supp. 2d 976, 992 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 527 (1977)) (holding that an ambiguous 
statement which was subject to multiple interpretations in the context of an asset purchase and sale 
agreement could still support a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation). 
 43.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977).  See also Catalina Yachts v. Old Colony 
Bank & Trust Co. of Middlesex Cnty., 497 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (D. Mass. 1980) (suggesting that 
selective disclosure by a bank could constitute fraudulent misrepresentation under the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977) if it was meant to “misrepresent the financial 
status of its customer[s]”).  The Restatement (Second) of Torts also provides some examples: stating 
that a title to land was upheld by a court, but failing to mention that the court’s decision has been 
appealed, or mentioning that all tenants pay a certain rent without stating that a rent control agency 
must approve the rent.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 cmt. b (1977). 
 44.  See, e.g., Zhang v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 708 N.E.2d 128, 134–35 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) 
(finding that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on a misrepresentation claim brought 
by an employee at the university research laboratory alleging that the defendant misrepresented the 
duration of employment because the plaintiff could not establish that the associate director 
misrepresented his intent to renew employment—an “essential element” of the plaintiff’s 
misrepresentation claim); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 (1977). 
 45.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 cmt. d (1977).  “One has reason to expect a result 
if he has information from which a reasonable man would conclude that the result will follow or 
would govern his conduct upon the assumption that it will do so.”  Id. 
 46.  Id. § 531.  The requisite intent is satisfied if the maker of the misrepresentation “either acts 
with the desire to cause it or acts believing that there is a substantial certainty that the result will 
follow from his conduct.”  Id. § 531 cmt. c; see also Dloogatch v. Brincat, 920 N.E.2d 1161, 1172 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (Murphy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that a shareholder’s 
complaint for fraudulent misrepresentation should be dismissed, but emphasizing that “inducing 
another to refrain from action is sufficient to state a cause of action for fraud [and that this principle] 
should apply equally to cases where a plaintiff is induced to refrain from selling stock”).  The maker 
of the misrepresentation can also be liable to a third party to whom the representation was not 
directly made if the maker has “information that would lead a reasonable man to conclude that there 
is an especial likelihood that it will reach those persons and will influence their conduct.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977).  Compare  W.L. Lindemann Operating Co. v. 
Strange, 256 S.W.3d 766, 780–81 (Tex. App. 2008) (finding that the defendant oil-well operator 
would have known that telling the plaintiff’s partner that he was “waiting for the water to hit” before 
pumping plaintiff’s wells would reach and influence plaintiff’s conduct because the parties had been 
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such, there is no liability for misrepresentations relied on by people whom 
the maker did not intend or have reason to expect to act or refrain from 
acting.47 
In order to recover, the plaintiff also must have been justified in relying 
on the misrepresentation.48  Reliance is justified where the misrepresentation 
is material49 from either an objective standard—a “reasonable man” would 
rely on that misrepresentation in deciding to act—or a subjective standard—
the maker of the misrepresentation “knows or has reason to know that its 
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining 
his choice of action.”50  However, where the recipient of the fraudulent 
 
doing business for thirty to forty years and defendant had prior dealings with plaintiff’s partner 
regarding the leases), with Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding no 
evidence supporting a fraudulent misrepresentation claim brought by a buyer of a ranch alleging 
misrepresentations about the presence of anthrax on the ranch because the representations were 
made to a previous buyer and were not communicated to the plaintiff). 
 47.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 cmt. b (1977).  However, there can still be 
liability to a party who justifiably relied on the maker’s misrepresentations even if those 
misrepresentations were not directly made to that party.  See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 622 F. 
Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (D. Idaho 2009) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977)) 
(denying the defendant chemical company’s motion for summary judgment given that liability for 
misrepresentation could be based on statements that the company made to others and intended to 
reach the plaintiff farmers).  This is the case where a person makes a misrepresentation to a third 
party and intends or has reason to expect that the representation will be conveyed to another who 
justifiably relies on the misrepresentation.  See, e.g., State v. Timblin, 657 N.W.2d 89, 96–97 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2002) (consulting the Restatement (Second) of Torts in a criminal case for felony theft to 
find that the defendant could not dispute responsibility on the grounds that he did not speak directly 
to the victims because there was probable cause that the victims relied on the misrepresentations, and 
that the defendant intended or had reason to expect that the statements would be relayed to the 
victims). 
 48.  See, e.g., Collins v. Huculak, 783 N.E.2d 834, 839 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that three 
sons could not have reasonably relied on their father’s false statement that a document the sons 
signed was for a bank, when in reality it was a deed conveying each son’s interest to his father and 
sister, because suspicious circumstances like the father’s refusal to let the sons read the document 
made it so that reliance was not justified); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977); 
Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs 
to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 14–20, 46 (2006) (arguing that 
state courts should enforce the traditional reliance requirement at the class certification stage in 
consumer fraud class actions in order to lessen consumer class action abuse). 
 49.  See Sherwin, supra note 33, at 1018 (emphasizing that materiality is a required element to 
recover in tort for misrepresentation, but not to obtain rescission under contract law).  Some scholars 
have found that “the role of materiality within the overall doctrine of misrepresentation is unclear” 
because, depending on what source one relies on, materiality can be seen as either a “separate 
requirement or a subcategory of justifiable reliance.”  Id. at 1019–20.  These two requirements of 
justifiable reliance and materiality have been explained by Prosser and Keeton—generally justifiable 
reliance is concerned with “representations that should not be believed,” while materiality is 
concerned with “representations that should not be acted on.”  Id. at 1020–21 (citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 108 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis 
added)). 
 50.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (emphasis added).  Finally, reliance is still 
justified even if the person who relied could have discovered the falsity of the representation through 
an investigation.  Id. § 540. 
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misrepresentation knows that the representation is false or where the 
representation is obviously false to him, the recipient is barred from 
recovery because his reliance would not be justified.51 
Finally, the recipient of the fraudulent misrepresentation must establish 
that he suffered damages as a result of the misrepresentation.52  The damages 
are measured by the pecuniary loss to the recipient.53 
 
 51.  See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for 
fraud where “no businessman in his right mind” could believe the defendants’ statement that the 
share price of stock would be unaffected by a stock split where each share would be split into four 
shares); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1977).  Generally, reliance is also 
unjustified when the fraudulent misrepresentation is the maker’s opinion and the opinion relates to a 
fact that is immaterial.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 542–543 (1977); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 544 (1977) (explaining when reliance on a statement of 
intention is justified); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 (1977) (detailing when reliance on a 
misrepresentation as to a matter of law is justified). 
 52.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 547 (1977); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 
(9th ed. 2009) (Pecuniary loss is “a loss of money or of something having monetary value.”).  
Despite the general notion that the tort of misrepresentation does not involve personal injury or 
damages other than pecuniary loss, section 557A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts appears to 
allow recovery for non-economic loss by imposing liability for physical harm to a person or to his 
chattel or land.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 557A cmt. a (1977) (suggesting that the 
recovery for physical harm is separate from economic injury by emphasizing that, in addition to 
recovery for physical harm, liability may “also extend[] to the economic loss resulting from the 
physical harm”).  A number of courts have interpreted this issue of recovery for non-pecuniary loss 
under section 557A, with some allowing and others denying damages for emotional distress in an 
action for fraud.  Compare Tolliver v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Midlands, 771 N.W.2d 908, 915–16 
(Neb. 2009) (finding that section 557A does not allow recovery for non-economic loss by 
interpreting the language in comment (a) to mean that the defendant would be liable for pecuniary 
loss normally allowed, as well as for other economic losses like “monetary losses for medical 
expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity, funeral costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair 
or replacement, costs of domestic services, loss of employment, and loss of business or employment 
opportunities”), with Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (finding 
that a case involving a contract actually sounded in tort for fraudulent misrepresentation and thus 
damages for mental suffering were available), and Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484–85 
(Conn. 1991) (allowing recovery for emotional damages in a misrepresentation action “where ‘the 
defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional 
distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm’” (citation 
omitted)).  Some scholars who also have considered the issue have proposed that misrepresentation 
law can provide a remedy for physical injuries and not just economic loss.  See, e.g., Barke, supra 
note 33, at 204–10 (explaining that numerous jurisdictions have allowed fraudulent 
misrepresentation claims in the following personal settings: transmission of venereal diseases, 
wrongful adoption, inducement of marriage, and statements regarding sterility or birth control); 
Steven J. Weingarten, Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment 
Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744, 744–45, 752 (1984) (arguing that misrepresentation law should 
apply to negligent speech that results in physical harm). 
 53.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977). 
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In addition to liability for pecuniary loss under section 525, section 310 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a cause of action for 
conscious misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm.54  Accordingly, 
[a]n actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to 
another for physical harm which results from an act done by the 
other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the 
representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or 
should realize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or a third 
person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the 
other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that he has 
not the knowledge which he professes.55 
In addition to representations of fact, section 310 also imposes liability 
for both representations of opinion and law.56  Moreover, liability not only 
extends to the person intended to be influenced by the misrepresentation, but 
to all others who the maker could foresee would be harmed by the 
misrepresentation.57  Generally, liability for conscious misrepresentations 
resulting in physical harm applies in cases where a misrepresentation about 
the physical condition of a thing—land, structures, or a chattel—induces 
another “to believe that the thing is in safe condition for his entry or use, or 
induces a third person to hold the land or chattel open to the entry or use of 
the other in the belief that it is safe for the purpose.”58 
ii. Negligent Misrepresentation 
In addition to fraudulent misrepresentation, a person may be liable in 
tort under another standard of liability—negligence.59  As codified in the 
 
 54.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. § 310 cmt. b. 
 57.  Id. § 310 cmt. c; see also Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 593 
(Cal. 1997). 
 58.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965); see, e.g., Gulf Prod. Co. v. Hoover 
Oilfield Supply, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (E.D. La. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff made a 
prima facie showing of intentional misrepresentation where the seller of natural gas flow lines 
misrepresented and withheld information about pipes used in the flow lines, which resulted in 
damage to the plaintiff’s land).  Not all causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation resulting in 
physical harm involve misrepresentations as to the physical condition of a “thing.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 cmt. c (1965); see, e.g., Passmore v. Multi-Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 810 
N.E.2d 1022, 1025–26 (Ind. 2004) (involving a suit for physical injuries based on misrepresented 
information made about a person in favorable employment recommendations). 
 59.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 528 (1977) (“A representation that is believed to state 
the truth but which because of negligent expression states what is false is a negligent but not a 
fraudulent misrepresentation.”); see also Steven M. Henderson, Walking the Line Between Contract 
and Tort in Construction Disputes: Assessing the Use of Negligent Misrepresentation to Recover 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, there are two types of negligent 
misrepresentation—one that concerns economic harm resulting from 
negligent speech60 and one that concerns physical harm.61  Section 552 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the former: 
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss 
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if 
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.62 
Although this standard encompasses liability for opinions as well as 
statements of fact,63 the maker of the representation must have a pecuniary 
interest in the transaction to be found liable.64  If the information is given 
needlessly in the sense that the maker has no pecuniary interest at stake, 
there is no liability under section 552.65  Liability is further limited under 
 
Economic Loss After Presnell, 95 KY. L.J. 145, 148 (2005) (analyzing Kentucky negligent 
misrepresentation in the context of construction disputes); Philip Steven Horne, Onita Pacific Corp. 
v. Trustees of Bronson: The Oregon Supreme Court Recognizes the Negligent Misrepresentation 
Tort, 72 OR. L. REV. 753, 753 (1993) (discussing how Oregon officially recognized negligent 
misrepresentation); Alissa J. Strong, “But He Told Me It Was Safe!”: The Expanding Tort of 
Negligent Misrepresentation, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2009) (tracing the history of the tort 
of negligent misrepresentation and arguing that courts should place limits on the tort, codified in 
section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, because “the expansion of the tort has had a 
chilling effect on the free flow of information”); Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent 
Misrepresentation in Texas: The Misunderstood Tort, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 845, 847 (2008) 
(clarifying the tort of negligent misrepresentation as applied in Texas and explaining who has 
standing to assert such a claim under Texas law). 
 60.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
 61.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965); see also Strong, supra note 59, at 109–10 
(focusing on the limits of liability for physical harm resulting from negligent speech under section 
311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). 
 62.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).  Liability for negligent misrepresentation 
is more limited than liability for fraudulent misrepresentation.  Compare id. (requiring that the maker 
of the representation make the representation “in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest”), with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (extending liability to anyone “who fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law” and otherwise meets the requirements for 
fraudulent misrepresentation). 
 63.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. b (1977). 
 64.  Id. § 552. 
 65.  Id. § 552 cmt. c (analogizing the pecuniary interest requirement under section 552 to 
situations where a person gratuitously gives chattel to another and therefore only has a duty to reveal 
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section 552 because these kinds of negligent misrepresentations only involve 
pecuniary harm, not physical harm to the plaintiff.66  Furthermore, liability 
only extends if the maker of the representation fails to exercise the degree of 
care that a reasonable man would exercise in providing the information to 
the plaintiff.67  Finally, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in relying on 
the misrepresentation bars recovery.68  Given these limitations, liability for 
negligent misrepresentations resulting in pecuniary loss tends to be much 
narrower in scope than liability for fraudulent misrepresentations.69 
While actions for misrepresentation under section 552 usually involve 
false information meant to guide others in their business transactions, 
misrepresentation claims for physical harm under section 311 impose no 
such requirement.70  Rather, section 311 provides: 
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the 
other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such 
harm results (a) to the other, or (b) to such third persons as the actor 
should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.  (2) Such 
negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care (a) in 
ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or (b) in the manner in 
which it is communicated.71 
 
information that he knows makes the chattel dangerous for use).  The pecuniary interest requirement 
is satisfied where the maker of the representation is given some kind of consideration for providing 
the information or where the information is supplied in the course of the maker’s business, 
profession, or employment.  Id. § 552 cmt. d. 
 66.  Id. § 552 cmt. a. 
 67.  Id. § 552 cmt. e.  Whether the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner is fact-
dependent and varies according to the recipient’s expectations based on the pertinent circumstances.  
Id. 
 68.  Id. § 552A (“The recipient of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for 
pecuniary loss suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent in so relying.”). 
 69.  Id. § 552 cmt. a (“The reason a narrower scope of liability is fixed for negligent 
misrepresentation than for deceit is to be found in the difference between the obligations of honesty 
and of care, and in the significance of this difference to the reasonable expectations of the users of 
information that is supplied in connection with commercial transactions.  Honesty requires only that 
the maker of a representation speak in good faith and without consciousness of a lack of any basis 
for belief in the truth or accuracy of what he says. . . . Unlike the duty of honesty, the duty of care to 
be observed in supplying information for use in commercial transactions implies an undertaking to 
observe a relative standard, which may be defined only in terms of the use to which the information 
will be put, weighed against the magnitude and probability of loss that might attend that use if the 
information proves to be incorrect.”). 
 70.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).  See also Strong, supra note 59, at 110 
(emphasizing that although section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires “a commercial 
relationship between the parties,” section 331 does not include such a requirement). 
 71.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).  A cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation varies by state, however, as not all states have adopted section 311 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Compare Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1259 n.9 (10th Cir. 2010) 
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Similar to liability for negligent misrepresentations causing pecuniary 
loss, liability for negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm 
usually involves representations made in a professional or business 
capacity.72  Even so, this is not an actual requirement, as there can still be 
liability under section 311 where a person negligently provides information 
to another “in the course of an activity which is in furtherance of his own 
interests.”73  Moreover, unlike section 552, section 311 does not limit 
liability when the negligent information is provided gratuitously.74  The key 
for liability under section 311 is that the negligent misrepresentation caused 
physical harm to the plaintiff.75  In addition to civil liability, 
misrepresentations can be criminalized. 
 
(emphasizing that Wyoming has not adopted the tort of negligent misrepresentation resulting in 
physical harm as codified under section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Flynn v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 351 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (reiterating that Minnesota only 
recognizes negligent misrepresentation actions for pecuniary loss and not for risk of physical harm), 
and Richland Sch. Dist. v. Mabton Sch. Dist., 45 P.3d 580, 587 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Washington has never adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 311 and no published case 
has discussed its applicability to Washington common law.  On these facts, we decline to adopt 
[s]ection 311 as a basis for negligent misrepresentation.”), with Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified 
Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 593 (Cal. 1997) (acknowledging that California has adopted section 311 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts), and Hall v. Ford Enters., Ltd., 445 A.2d 610, 612 (D.C. 1982) 
(recognizing that Washington D.C. allows claims for negligent misrepresentation resulting in 
physical harm and explaining the elements for such a cause of action in the jurisdiction). 
 72.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).  But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 525 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965) (including no similar 
requirement that the representation be made in a professional or business capacity). 
 73.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 cmt. b (1965). 
 74.  Compare Id. § 311, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).  Furthermore, in 
allowing recovery for physical harm caused by purely gratuitous, negligent information, section 311 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for a broader basis of liability than was allowed under 
the Restatement (First) of Torts.  Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 311 (1934) (“One a 
part of whose business or profession it is to give information upon which the bodily security of 
others depends and who in his business or professional capacity gives false information to another is 
subject to liability for bodily harm . . . .” (emphasis added)), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 311 (1965) (“One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability 
for physical harm . . . .”). 
 75.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines physical harm as “physical impairment of the 
human body, or of land or chattels.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965).  Bodily harm is 
further defined as “physical impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or 
illness.”  Id. § 15.  In applying section 311, some courts have attempted to define the limits of the 
physical harm requirement.  See, e.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 
885, 891 (D. Minn. 1999) (finding that sexual assault fails to satisfy the physical injury requirement 
because the physical harm requirement “excludes offensive bodily contact . . . even though the 
contact may offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, unless the contact produces ‘physical 
impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain, or illness’” (citation omitted)); 
Friedman v. Merck & Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 909 (Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal of a case 
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2.  Criminal Misrepresentation 
A misrepresentation can be a crime as a matter of federal or state law.76  
What distinguishes a criminal misrepresentation from a civil one is “the 
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies [the] 
imposition [of a criminal sanction].”77  In other words, a criminal 
misrepresentation “is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will 
incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the 
community.”78  Through various statutes, different jurisdictions have 
expressed their “community condemnation” of online misrepresentations.79 
Some statutes that criminalize misrepresentations focus on online 
harassment.80  For example, a Texas law makes it a felony of the third 
degree—punishable by two to ten years in prison and a fine of up to 
$10,000—to use “the name or persona of another person to . . . create a web 
page” or post “one or more messages on . . . a commercial social networking 
site”81 “without obtaining the other person’s consent and with the intent to 
harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person . . . .”82  The law also 
makes it a class A misdemeanor—punishable by up to one year in prison and 
a fine of up to $10,000—to send “an electronic mail, instant message, text 
message, or similar communication that references a name, domain address, 
phone number, or other item of identifying information belonging to any 
 
where the “direct result of defendant’s alleged wrongdoing was emotional rather than physical 
harm” and emphasizing that California does not recognize suits for negligent misrepresentation 
resulting in a risk of emotional injury); see also Amy Leonard, The Rise of Neo-Scientists 
Advocating for Polluters and the Laws That Deter Them, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 344–45 (2007) 
(arguing that section 311 should apply to neo-scientists who present false information about health 
and safety issues, such as the nature of environmental contamination or effects of a particular 
chemical resulting in physical harm). 
 76.  “[I]n every state and in the federal system, legislators . . . exercise primary responsibility for 
defining criminal conduct and for devising the rules of criminal responsibility.”  JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 2007). 
 77.  Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 78.  Id. at 3. 
 79.  See infra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 80.  Other statutes commonly criminalize online harassment like cyberbullying, which does not 
necessarily involve any misrepresentation.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7(A) (2010) 
(criminalizing cyberbullying—“the transmission of any electronic textual, visual, written, or oral 
communication with the malicious and willful intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a 
person under the age of eighteen”). 
 81.  A “commercial social networking site” is defined as: 
[A]ny business, organization, or other similar entity operating a website that permits 
persons to become registered users for the purpose of establishing personal relationships 
with other users through direct or real-time communication with other users or the 
creation of web pages or profiles available to the public or to other users. 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07(f)(1) (West 2009).  However, the “term does not include an 
electronic mail program or a message board program.”  Id. 
 82.  Id. § 33.07(a). 
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person” if it is done “(1) without obtaining the other person’s consent; (2) 
with the intent to cause a recipient of the communication to reasonably 
believe that the other person authorized or transmitted the communication; 
and (3) with the intent to harm or defraud any person.”83  Other states have 
started to follow this approach to regulate misleading online behavior. 
On January 1, 2011, California added a provision to its penal code that 
makes it a crime to impersonate another person on a social networking site.84  
Specifically, “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly 
impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web site or by 
other electronic means for purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or 
defrauding another person”85 is punishable “by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding 
one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.”86  In order to be guilty 
under this statute, the impersonation has to be “credible.”87  Moreover, guilt 
extends to “opening an e-mail account or an account or profile on a social 
networking Internet Web site in another person’s name.”88  The statute also 
provides for a civil action under another section of the penal code89 for a 
person who suffers damage or loss as a result of the impersonation.90  
Statutes like those in Texas and California reflect a modern trend towards 
criminalizing deceit on social networking sites.  In light of these kinds of 
laws that impose serious criminal sanctions for social networking 
misrepresentations, it is necessary to consider how misrepresentations take 
place on these websites. 
B.  Deceit in a Networked World 
In today’s networked world, misrepresentation is not limited to 
commercial transactions, or solely disseminated through traditional sources 
 
 83.  Id. § 33.07(b).  A defendant prosecuted under any part of the statute can assert a defense if 
the actor is a commercial social networking site or another entity listed in the statute.  Id. § 
33.07(e)(1)–(5).  It is also a defense if the defendant acted as an employee of a commercial social 
networking site or another entity listed in the statute.  Id. 
 84.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011). 
 85.  Id. § 528.5(a). 
 86.  Id. § 528.5(d). 
 87.  Id. § 528.5(a).  “[A]n impersonation is credible if another person would reasonably believe, 
or did reasonably believe, that the defendant was or is the person who was impersonated.”  Id. § 
528.5(b). 
 88.  Id. § 528.5(c). 
 89.  Id. § 502. 
 90.  Id. § 528.5(e). 
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of distribution and news.91  Rather, the online information age has provided 
a forum that is particularly conducive to misrepresentation.  Cyberspace 
facilitates deceptive behavior given the availability of anonymous 
communications.92  Online social networking sites93 play a crucial role in 
connecting people all around the world—a level of interconnectedness 
 
 91.  The Internet has not only had profound implications for misrepresentation law, which has 
yet to be considered in depth by any court or scholar, but it has also affected other areas of the law.  
See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261 (2010) (discussing the ways in which defamation 
law has been affected by a networked society); Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal 
Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 458–68 (2008) (analyzing the ways in which legal issues are implicated when 
an employer investigates an applicant’s social networking profile and discussing implications in the 
areas of privacy, discrimination, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and defamation); Scott Hammack, 
The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires a Modification of the Courts’ 
Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 68, 101–02 (2002) 
(arguing that the Internet has increased the threatening effects of online speech and has changed the 
way that courts should approach true threats in the context of speech and the First Amendment); 
Sung In, Death of a Trademark: Genericide in the Digital Age, 21 REV. LITIG. 159, 176 (2002) 
(discussing the interplay between trademark “genericide” and the “explosive growth of the 
Internet”); Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment Interests, 
Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking Sites, 8 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 176, 211–16 (2009) (suggesting a new revised approach to the Communications Decency 
Act in light of the evolution of online posting on blogs and social networking sites); Rustad & 
Koenig, supra note 14, at 80 (examining how courts have applied traditional tort concepts to the 
Internet and concluding “that tort law continues to lag behind the technological dilemmas created by 
an increasingly networked society”). 
 92.  See Stephanie Rosenbloom, Putting Your Best Cyberface Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/fashion/03impression.html?pagewanted=all (discussing 
“impression management”—the way in which people control how they are perceived—in the context 
of cyberspace and suggesting that “[s]ome misrepresentation stems from the actual structure of 
networking sites”).  Professor David Whittier from Boston University’s School of Education has 
suggested that it is “just so much easier to pretend to be someone else online [and that] [p]eople are 
very eager to try it out . . . .”  Tim Barker, Tech Tuesday: Role-Playing Online Draws Eye of the 
Law, THE JAMES LOGAN COURIER (Jan. 22, 2008, 7:53 AM), 
http://www.jameslogancourier.org/index.php?itemid=3215. 
 93.  John A. Barnes was the first scholar to use the term “social network.”  DAVID KNOKE & 
SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 8 (2d ed. 2008).  As an anthropologist, Barnes studied 
the relationships among people on a Norwegian island.  Id.  As a result of his studies, he concluded 
that social interactions are a “‘set of points some of which are joined by lines’ to form a ‘total 
network’ of relations.”  Id. at 8–9 (citation omitted).  Today, there are numerous studies on “social 
network” analysis.  See, e.g., id.; Damon Centola, The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social 
Network Experiment, 329 SCIENCE 1194 (2010); Joseph Galaskiewicz & Stanley Wasserman, 
Introduction: Advances in the Social and Behavioral Sciences from Social Network Analysis, in 
ADVANCES IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
xi, xii (Stanley Wasserman & Joseph Galaskiewicz eds., 1994); Gueorgi Kossinets & Duncan J. 
Watts, Empirical Analysis of an Evolving Social Network, 311 SCIENCE 88 (2006).  Social network 
analysis focuses on the “relationships among social entities and on the patterns and implications of 
these relationships.”  Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, supra, at xii.  Rather than studying individuals, 
scholars in this area of study focus on social entities.  Id.  In this context, a social network is defined 
as “a structure composed of a set of actors, some of whose members are connected by a set of one or 
more relations.”  KNOKE & YANG, supra, at 8.  Essentially, different relationships constitute 
different networks.  Id. 
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unimaginable before the development of these sites—and thus multiply the 
situations in which people make representations to others.94  The 
development and effects of social networking sites emphasize that 
misrepresentation law may be an appropriate mechanism for regulating 
Internet activity.95 
1.  The Rise of Social Networking Sites 
Over the past five centuries, new transportation and communication 
devices have created a more “networked” world.96  Technology has evolved 
from sails and steam power to railroads and radios, and eventually to 
telephones and the Internet.97  Today, modern technology, especially the 
Internet, provides people around the world with the opportunity to interact 
personally or commercially.98  In this context of the online world, social 
 
 94.  According to Thomas L. Friedman, the millennium marked a new era—“Globalization 
3.0”—which “is shrinking the world from a size small to a size tiny.”  THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE 
WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10 (2005).  In this era of 
Globalization 3.0, the dynamic force is “the newfound power for individuals to collaborate and 
compete globally.”  Id. 
 95.  In assessing the effects of social networking sites and their implications for 
misrepresentation claims, free speech issues must be taken into consideration.  See, e.g., Strong, 
supra note 59, at 118 (arguing that “[c]ourts must strike a balance between the value of shared 
information (particularly regarding physical safety) and the value of holding people accountable for 
negligently inaccurate speech about such risks”); see also infra Part III. 
 96.  Ardia, supra note 91, at 270. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  While most people view the Internet as an advantageous and necessary advance for society, 
the Internet can be seen as a double-edged sword and perhaps a necessary evil.  For example, the 
language of the Communications Decency Act evidences the benefits of the Internet and the value 
that the federal government has placed on it.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (“(1) The rapidly developing 
array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent 
an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens.  (2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they 
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.  (3) 
The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.  (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of 
all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.  (5) Increasingly Americans are relying 
on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”).  
However, some scholars have argued that the rise of the Internet has led to the destruction of 
territorial borders and a diminishing of the nation-state.  See infra note 373 and accompanying text.  
This tension between the benefits and disadvantages of the Internet is further evidenced by studies 
on how the Internet has caused changes in the way that people think and concentrate.  See, e.g., 
NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (1st ed. 2010).  
The reality of cyber-crime and cyber-harassment also emphasizes the negative implications of the 
Internet.  See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online 
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networking sites99 have played an integral role in creating virtual 
communities.100 
Two of the most popular and pervasive social networking sites, 
Facebook and MySpace, were launched in 2004.101  By the end of 2008 and 
the start of 2009, social networking became even more popular than            
e-mail.102  In fact, Internet users currently spend about ten percent of their 
online time on social networking sites.103  Originally, these sites were 
 
Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 429 (2009) (discussing how there has been a 
monetization of Internet harassment and how this has had negative implications, as reputation 
defense services actually perpetuate harassment in order to receive financial benefits from the 
services they provide); Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech 
and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 237–40 (2008) (describing how the anonymous 
nature of the Internet actually helps to facilitate cyber-harassment); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, 
at 81 (“The Internet provides a venue for new types of sexual harassment and for vicious hate 
crimes.”).  As of 2008, cyber-crime was estimated to be a $105 billion market.  Leslie D’Monte, 
Virtual Nightmares Ride High, COMPUTER CRIME RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 3, 2008), 
http://www.crime-research.org/articles/e-commerce08/. 
 99.  For a step-by-step description of how social networking sites work, see generally U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO 
FDNS (July 20, 2010), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/ 
DHS_CustomsImmigration_SocialNetworking.pdf; see also Catherine Dwyer et al., Trust and 
Privacy Concern Within Social Networking Sites: A Comparison of Facebook and MySpace, 13 
AMCIS PROC. (2007), available at http://csis.pace.edu/~dwyer/research/DwyerAMCIS2007.pdf. 
 100.  See Ardia, supra note 91, at 271–72 (“Virtual communities have sprung up, social networks 
have bloomed, and individuals are rushing onto the Internet to engage, argue, and disparage each 
other.”).  For many people, social networking sites are virtual communities through which they can 
make important personal contacts with others in seeking jobs.  See Jeff Greer, The Art of Self-
Marketing Online, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 15, 2010, at 30, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2010/04/15/the-art-of-self-marketing-online (arguing that 
people should use social networking sites and expand their presence on the Internet in order to find a 
job in a harsh economic climate).  Generally, all social networking sites serve the same function—
they help people communicate with friends, family, and coworkers, and they “facilitate the sharing 
of information through the social graph, the digital mapping of people’s real-world social 
connections.”  Factsheet, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/press/info.php%20?factsheet (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2011); see also Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery 
Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 22–23 (2009) (mentioning that social networking sites are also 
“key source[s] of information” about people); Laura Locke, The Future of Facebook, TIME, July 17, 
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1644040,00.html (covering an 
interview with Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, who explained that Facebook is intended to 
model the “real” connections that people have in the world, rather than to build a new community or 
new connections). 
 101.  Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet#!/press/ 
info.php?timeline (last visited Feb. 7, 2012); Timeline, MYSPACE, http://myspace-
press.burakccg.com/timeline-2 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 102.  Lisa Thomas, Social Networking in the Workplace: Are Private Employers Prepared to 
Comply with Discovery Requests for Posts and Tweets?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2010). 
 103.  Id.  Apparently, Russians spend more time on social networking sites than any other people.  
Robin Wauters, comScore: Russians Spend More Time on Social Networks than the Rest of World, 
TECHCRUNCH EUROPE (July 2, 2009), http://eu.techcrunch.com/2009/07/02/comscore-russians-
spend-more-time-on-social-networks-than-rest-of-world/.  For a study on how users differ in their 
levels of engagement with social networking sites, see generally Eszter Hargittai & Yu-li Patrick 
Hsieh, From Dabblers to Omnivores: A Typology of Social Network Site Usage, in A NETWORKED 
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predominantly used by teenagers and young adults; however, many different 
segments of society use social networking sites today.104  One 2010 survey 
suggests that forty-seven percent of Internet users aged fifty to sixty-four 
years old and twenty-six percent of those over sixty-five use social 
networking sites.105  Given further statistics on Facebook and MySpace,106 it 
is evident that social networking sites have become omnipresent and an 
integral part of many people’s social lives.107 
 
SELF: IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 146 (Zizi Papacharissi 
ed., 2010).  Other studies have focused on education and online skills as factors affecting the varying 
uses of the Internet by young adults.  See, e.g., Paul DiMaggio et al., Digital Inequality: From 
Unequal Access to Differentiated Use, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 355–400 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 
2004). 
 104.  Nicolas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients Who “Friend” or “Tweet”: Constructing a Legal 
Framework for Social Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285, 286 (2010).  
According to one study, thirty-five percent of adults and sixty-five percent of teenagers using the 
Internet have social networking profiles.  AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET, ADULTS AND SOCIAL 
NETWORK WEBSITES 1 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://socialnetworking.procon.org/ 
sourcefiles/PEWJan2009.pdf. 
 105.  The Aging of Social Networks, SOCIAL MEDIA OPTIMIZATION (Sept. 15, 2010), http://social-
media-optimization.com/2010/09/the-aging-of-social-networks/ (providing the following reasons for 
the appeal of social networking sites to adults: (1) reconnecting with people; and (2) keeping up with 
the lives of one’s children and grandchildren).  But see A Look at Twitter Demographics, SOCIAL 
MEDIA OPTIMIZATION (Feb. 16, 2010), http://social-media-optimization.com/2010/02/a-look-at-
twitter-demographics/ (explaining that Twitter was originally more popular with adults, unlike other 
social networking sites, but that the fastest growing segment on the social networking site is those 
who are twenty-four years old and younger). 
 106.  See infra notes 108–18 and accompanying text. 
 107.  Social networking sites have become such an integral part of everyday life that even 
politicians recognize the necessity of using these sites in order to reach out to voters.  See Legislative 
Social Media Sites, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
default.aspx?tabid=13409 (last updated Oct. 31, 2011) (tracking the use of social networking sites by 
state legislative agencies and caucuses to reach out to constituents, and evidencing that Facebook, 
MySpace, Twitter, and YouTube have become popular with these legislators and caucuses).  In 
2009, the White House “announced that it was joining Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace to meet 
President Barack Obama’s call one week earlier ‘to reform our government so that it is more 
efficient, more transparent, and more creative.’”  Are Social Networking Sites Good for Our 
Society?, PROCON.ORG, http://socialnetworking.procon.org/ #Background (last updated Nov. 14, 
2011).  These attempts by politicians to make use of social networking sites seem founded, given 
that over one-fourth of American voters under thirty years old reported that they got information 
about the 2008 presidential campaigns via social networking sites.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL 
NETWORKING AND ONLINE VIDEOS TAKE OFF: INTERNET’S BROADER ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008, at 9 
(Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://people-press.org/report/384/internets-broader-role-in-campaign-
2008.  Social networking sites have had a profound impact in the international context as well.  In 
2009, Iranians used Twitter to evade the government’s control of other media forms during the 
Iranian presidential elections.  Lev Grossman, Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement, 
TIME, June 17, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html.  
During these elections, the United States State Department even asked Twitter to delay a network 
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Currently, Facebook has over 800 million users who share over 250 
million photos per day.108  More than 400 million of these users log on in 
any given day, and approximately 350 million users access the site through a 
mobile device.109  On average, users have 130 friends, and the site has over 
900 million pages, groups, events, and community pages.110  Overall, 
Facebook has a tremendous global reach, which is evident by the fact that 
seventy-five percent of Facebook users are from outside of the United 
States.111 
Similarly, MySpace has over 100 million users, fifty percent of whom 
are outside of the United States.112  The site is used in twenty-nine different 
regions and is translated into fifteen different languages.113  In the United 
States, fifty percent of MySpace users are between the ages of twelve and 
thirty-four.114  MySpace mobile users spend over forty minutes a week on 
the site—apparently the greatest mobile usage of any social networking 
site.115  The site suggests that its users are connected “to the music, 
celebrities, TV, movies, and games that they love.”116  Additionally, the 
social networking site also includes “MySpace Music”—the most popular 
music site in the world.117  Through MySpace Music, five hundred new 
 
upgrade to allow the Iranian protestors to continue posting information about what was really going 
on in Iran during the elections.  Id. 
 108.  Statistics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov. 
18, 2011).  In the United States, there are around 145,331,600 Facebook users.  Andréa Ford, The 
Global Network: Facebook Has Conquered America. Can It Take Over the World?, TIME, Dec. 27, 
2010, at 59, available at www.time.com/time/pdf/global_network.pdf.  Of all the states, Rhode 
Island has the most Facebook users—approximately sixty-five percent—while New Mexico has the 
lowest usage—approximately thirty percent.  Id. 
 109.  Statistics, supra note 108. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id.  Although Facebook is constantly blocked in China, approximately 92,540 Chinese 
people still use the site.  Ford, supra note 108, at 59.  In Japan, Facebook users can post information 
about their blood type on their Facebook profiles.  Id.  In Afghanistan, eighty-five percent of 
Facebook users are male.  Id.  India has approximately 16,509,680 Facebook users.  Id.  About 
eighty-six percent of Iceland’s population uses Facebook.  Id.  Unlike many other people, more 
Brazilians use Google’s Orkut than Facebook as their social networking site of choice—20.5 million 
more Brazilians used Orkut than Facebook by August 2010, and only 8,176,820 used Facebook.  Id.  
Generally, proposed legislation from around the world highlights that social networking sites have 
had a wide global reach and have affected people internationally.  See, e.g., ARTICLE 29 DATA 
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 5/2009 ON ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING (June 12, 2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf (focusing 
on how social networking sites can be reformed to comply with European Union data protection 
law). 
 112.  Fact Sheet, MYSPACE, http://myspace-press.burakccg.com/fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  About Us, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/AboutUs (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 117.  Fact Sheet, supra note 112. 
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artists, twenty-five new albums, and over fifty live shows are added and 
premiered each week.118 
Certainly, social networking sites are not limited to just Facebook119 and 
MySpace.120  Given the plethora of these sites and their pervasive nature, it 
is no surprise that social networking sites have multiplied the situations in 
which people can misrepresent not only themselves, but virtually 
anything.121 
2.  The Prevalence of Misrepresentations in an Interconnected Society 
In order to understand the misrepresentations that people make through 
social networking sites, it is necessary to first consider the extent to which 
people lie and make misrepresentations in a broader context.  Some scholars 
have suggested that society is becoming increasingly dishonest.122  One 
study has revealed that most people tell an average of two to three lies 
within a ten minute conversation.123  Another study has suggested that 
people lie in one out of three normal conversations and tell anywhere from 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  One source suggests that Facebook is still the most popular U.S. social networking site.  See 
Top Twenty Five Social Networking Sites—May 2009, SOCIAL MEDIA OPTIMIZATION (June 22, 
2009), http://social-media-optimization.com/2009/06/top-twenty-five-social-networking-sites-
%e2%80%93-may-2009/. 
 120.  In addition to these two sites, the top twenty social networking sites in the United States 
include Twitter, Classmates.com sites, Mylife.com sites, Windows Live Profile, Buzznet, Bebo, 
Digg, Yahoo! Buzz, Linkedin, DeviantART, Tagged, hi5, Gaia Online, SodaHead.com, 
BlackPlanet.com, AOL Community, Plaxo, and FunAdvice.com.  See id.  For a list of social 
networking sites popular in different countries and the corresponding registered users per site, see 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 99, at 2. 
 121.  It is important to note, however, that these sites do not only facilitate misrepresentations, but 
actually also permit the detection of fraudulent behavior.  See, e.g., Roberto Ceniceros, Comp Cheats 
Confess All on Social Network Sites, 43 BUS. INS. 1 (2009) (discussing how social networking sites 
are useful tools for worker compensation claim investigators to detect fraudulent claims by 
discovering information posted online about the claimant’s activities that contradicts allegations of 
physical injury). 
 122.  Q and A with Robert Feldman, ROBERTFELDMAN.ORG, http://www.robertfeldman.org/ 
conversation.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (suggesting that, since the lies of the Clinton era, 
Americans have become “more tolerant of deception”). 
 123.  Id.; see also ROBERT FELDMAN, THE LIAR IN YOUR LIFE: THE WAY TO TRUTHFUL 
RELATIONSHIPS (2009).  On the moral depravity of lying, see generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: 
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to 
Lie from Altruistic Motives, in IMMANUEL KANT: CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER 
WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1949) 
(1797); Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the 
Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157 (2001); Christine M. 
Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing With Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325 (1986). 
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zero to forty-six lies in one week.124  Among university students, ninety-two 
percent lied to their close friends.125  It has also been proposed that children 
may lie more than adults, and women more than men.126   
In order to understand the legal implications of lying, scholars and 
social psychologists have proposed various theories and explanations as to 
why people deceive others or misrepresent themselves.127  Many assume that 
people pervert the truth or intentionally mislead others to make themselves 
more agreeable and “to avoid giving offense to others or to maintain good 
social relations.”128  In addition to politeness, other motivations for lying are 
guilt and self-promotion.129  Other times, people lie to preserve the 
innocence of children and even to brag about one’s own ability to get away 
with lying.130  In the aggregate, these white lies can “create a climate for 
greater deceptions, leading to ‘a culture of lies’ that pervades today’s 
society.”131   
However, not all lies have the same moral reprehensibility or 
nefariousness and the need for a legal remedy or punishment may depend on 
the type of deceit involved.132  In order to determine the appropriate legal 
mechanism for regulating misrepresentations on social networking sites, it 
helps to view misrepresentations as a part of a “taxonomy” of lies.133  
Essentially, there are varying degrees of misrepresentations—lies “without 
any redeeming properties,” white lies that do not have serious implications, 
fibs that are selfishly motivated, compassionate lies meant to “spare the 
hearer,” and justified lies.134  Depending on the motivation for the 
misrepresentation and the gravity of its negative effects or resulting injury, a 
legal remedy may or may not be appropriate.135 
 
 124.  Bruce Fraser, The Neutral as Lie Detector: You Can’t Judge Participants by Their 
Demeanor, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 259, 259 (2004). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 166 (1999). 
 127.  See, e.g., Q and A with Robert Feldman, supra note 122 (explaining that people lie “to make 
social interactions proceed more smoothly,” “to be agreeable or to . . . feel better about 
[themselves],” and “to build themselves up or to gain some advantage over [others]”); Rosenbloom, 
supra note 92 (suggesting that people may misrepresent themselves online “to express an idealized 
or future version of themselves—someone who is thinner or has actually finished Dante’s 
‘Inferno’”). 
 128.  Green, supra note 123, at 169; see also Rosenbloom, supra note 92. 
 129.  Fraser, supra note 124, at 259. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Robert Feldman, ROBERTFELDMAN.ORG, http://www.robertfeldman.org/index.php (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 132.  See Green, supra note 123, at 169 (discussing circumstances under which a lie or deception 
might be justified); see also Allen, supra note 126, at 169 (suggesting that the morality of lying 
depends on who is lying, who is being lied to, and what the lying concerns). 
 133.  Fraser, supra note 124, at 260. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See infra note 361 and accompanying text. 
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Through the growth of social networking sites, the opportunities for 
people to make misrepresentations and deceive others have significantly 
multiplied.136  This is arguably facilitated by the anonymous nature of online 
communications,137 even if people do in fact use their real identities on 
social networking sites.138  To the same extent that research discloses that 
 
 136.  See WEB OF DECEPTION: MISINFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (Anne P. Mintz ed., 2002) 
(discussing how the Internet has allowed intentionally misleading information to flourish and 
mentioning the implications these misrepresentations have had on things like privacy, online 
purchases, business decisions and more).  In addition to encouraging and facilitating 
misrepresentations, our globally networked world has also had profound effects in other areas of the 
law.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 79–80 (“The globally-networked world has created new 
civil wrongs such as cyberpiracy, online gambling, pop-up advertising, cybersquatting, spamming, 
tarnishment through linking, cybersmearing, and dot.org hate web sites for which effective legal 
remedies are only beginning to evolve.”); see also David Finkelhor, Janis Wolak & Kimberly J. 
Mitchell, Online Safety: Why Research Is Important, PUBLIUS PROJECT (June 27, 2010), 
http://publius.cc/online_safety_why_research_important (arguing that research for online safety 
programs is necessary and mentioning a few high-profile cases highlighting the dangers of the 
Internet); Top 10 People Caught on Facebook, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/ 
specials/packages/article/0,28804,1943680_1943678_1943657,00.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) 
(mentioning an instance where Facebook was used as a “crime-fighting tool” by allowing police to 
arrest Steelers fans who posted pictures of themselves destroying property in the street after the 
Super Bowl). 
 137.  See Jameson, supra note 98, at 238–39 (“Anonymity on the Internet allows individuals to 
provide opinions and information that they might never otherwise divulge, including information 
that is false and harmful to third parties.”).  In fact, “‘[w]hen people are less accountable for their 
conduct, they are more likely to engage in unsavory acts.  When anonymous, people are often much 
nastier and more uncivil in their speech.  It is easier to say harmful things about others when we 
don’t have to take responsibility.’”  Id. at 239 (quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 140 (2007)). 
 138.  Rosenbloom, supra note 92 (“Some misrepresentation stems from the actual structure of 
networking sites.  For instance, people who decide to grow younger on dating Web sites often do so 
by a couple of years because they would otherwise be filtered out of search results that use age 
brackets.”).  But see id. (suggesting that misrepresentation may be less of an issue on social 
networking sites because people are less likely to deviate from the truth where they are monitored by 
a network of friends); Kim Hart, The Rise of Alter Egos in Everybody’s Space: After Oversharing, 
Users Recast Their Online Personas, WASH. POST, May 2, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/01/AR2008050103513_pf.html (mentioning that places like 
Facebook are not places to experiment with one’s identity, but are rather places to mirror real-life 
personalities and social contexts); Finkelhor et al., supra note 136 (suggesting that, despite the 
problems that anonymity might pose, the Internet may actually have more protective qualities and 
serve to mitigate harms suffered by victims of cyberbullying or sexual assault, as they are somewhat 
shielded by a virtual world).  Other sources, like the Department of Homeland Security, have found 
that social networking sites have actually been helpful for the Office of Fraud Detection and 
National Security to detect immigration fraud.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra 
note 99, at 1 (“Generally, people on these sites speak honestly in their network because all of their 
friends and family are interacting with them via IM’s (Instant Messages), Blogs (Weblog journals), 
etc.”).  On the importance of anonymous speech and its role in the marketplace of ideas, see 
generally Brief of Amici Curiae Citizen Media Law Project et al. at 2–3, Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g 
Co., 929 N.E.2d 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (No. 03-08-0805). 
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lying is more rampant in e-mail than in face-to-face communications, 
misrepresentation is arguably even easier on social networking sites.139  
Even the social networking sites themselves acknowledge the potential 
problems with misrepresentation that can easily occur through the use of the 
sites.140  Essentially, there may be something inherent in the nature of social 
networking sites that makes lying easier than it would be in other forms of 
communication.141 
Some social psychologists have found that people modify, and perhaps 
misrepresent, their personalities on these sites to meet certain goals.142  This 
kind of tailoring of one’s personality is especially pronounced when people 
have to deal with “competing audiences” on social networking sites.143  
Another factor inherent in the nature of social networking sites that might 
further fuel misrepresentations and fabricated personalities is their lack of 
privacy.144  In other words, “[m]odifying online personalities in search of 
more privacy” might be “‘a natural evolution in our relationship with these 
technologies.’”145  One study proposes that privacy concerns and trust on 
social networking sites might affect information sharing—the extent to 
which people share identifying or true information.146  Another explanation 
for why people might be more likely to lie on social networking sites is the 
 
 139.  New Research Finds Workers More Prone to Lie in E-mail, EUREKALERT! (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-09/lu-nrf092508.php; see also David Wood, No Easy 
Remedy for Imposter Postings on Social Networking Sites: Like Graffiti, Phony Postings are 
Offensive But Hard to Control, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/03/myspace_impostors.html (“‘One of the things 
intriguing to me is that people will do things on the Internet that they wouldn’t think of doing in a 
newspaper or magazine . . . .’” (quoting Loyola Law School Professor John Nockleby)). 
 140.  See Locke, supra note 100.  For example, Facebook recognizes misrepresentation as a 
violation of the company policy and deactivates accounts made under fake names.  Id.; see also Hart, 
supra note 138. 
 141.  Evan E. North, Comment, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social 
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1299 (2010) (“[S]ocial-networking sites lack 
meaningful controls to prevent users from falsifying information to mislead other users.”). 
 142.  Hart, supra note 138. 
 143.  Id.  In making representations on social networking sites, people do not only communicate 
with friends, but their communications are often available to and accessible by family, co-workers, 
and perhaps even strangers.  See id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. (quoting Pew Internet Senior Research Specialist Mary Madden); see also Facebook 
Users: Trading Privacy for Friends?, AFP (Sept. 26, 2007), http://afp.google.com/ 
article/ALeqM5hnJl3rLVq-uXFqcWpp03J7JeYaxA (“‘We are really heading into new modes of 
publishing ourselves, we are kind of learning on the job . . . .’”). 
 146.  See generally Dwyer et al., supra note 99.  In a comparison of Facebook and MySpace, it 
appears that Facebook members, who are more trusting of Facebook than MySpace users are of 
MySpace, are more likely to include truthful, identifying information on their profiles.  Id. 
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lack of inhibition and the sense of freedom in online communications.147  
Through this sense of freedom, people are able to create whatever persona 
they want for themselves.148 
Usually, the misrepresentations are harmless, rather than intentional or 
destructive.149  For example, people may often exaggerate or lie about the 
kinds of television shows or books that they like to make themselves appear 
more intelligent.150  Others “strategically lie” on online dating sites about 
their age, weight, height, personal attributes, interests, assets, goals, and past 
relationships.151  Most people are familiar with these kinds of 
misrepresentations and would agree that these white lies are not worthy of 
serious legal ramifications.  However, other types of lies on these social 
networking sites merit a legal remedy.  For example, cybercrimes such as 
identity theft—a quintessential form of misrepresentation—certainly merit 
legal consequences.152  Social networking sites may also make it easier for 
online sexual predators to misrepresent their identities with fake profiles153 
to gain the trust of their victims.154  A recent document by the United States 
 
 147.  Barker, supra note 92 (“‘It’s just so much easier to pretend to be someone else online.  
People are very eager to try it out.’” (quoting Boston University School of Education Professor 
David Whittier)). 
 148.  Charles W. Bryant, Are People More Honest or Dishonest on Social Networks?, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/information/ 
social-networks-honesty.htm/printable (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See Jeffrey A. Hall et al., Strategic Misrepresentation in Online Dating: The Effects of 
Gender, Self-Monitoring, and Personality Traits, 27 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 117 (2010) 
(studying the gender differences in misrepresentation and arguing that certain demographic and 
personal characteristics are predictors of misrepresentation). 
 152.  Jane Schmitt, Crimes in Cyber Space, COMPUTER CRIME RESEARCH CENTER (May 28, 
2008), http://www.crime-research.org/analytics/computer_crime22/ (describing the rise of cyber 
liability as one of the “fastest-growing segments of the national property and casualty market” and 
discussing the emergence of cyber-insurance in response to cyber-crime). 
 153.  Generally, masquerading behind a fake identity can be a real problem on social networking 
sites.  John Nockleby, a Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, has suggested that 
“‘[m]asquerading as another person certainly could potentially violate several torts.’”  Wood, supra 
note 139. 
 154.  As of 2009, MySpace reported that there were 90,000 registered sex offenders who had 
profiles on the site.  Are Social Networking Sites Good for Our Society?, supra note 107 (citing 
Nathan Olivarez-Giles, More Sex Offenders Joined MySpace Than Previously Acknowledged, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009).  Facebook declined to report the number of sex offenders using its site.  Id.  
Recognizing the dangers of online predators, Illinois passed a law in August 2009, which prohibited 
sex offenders from using social networking sites.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16D-2 (repealed 2011).  
One study suggests that online sexual predators are actually more common on chat rooms and instant 
messaging than on social networking sites.  Are Social Networking Sites Good for Our Society?, 
supra note 107. 
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Citizenship and Immigration Services suggests that federal agents might also 
use social networking sites to create phony profiles in order to detect fraud 
and see if people are in valid relationships or are trying to deceive 
immigration services.155   
Misrepresentations on these sites can also create problems with 
intellectual property.156  For example, a group of people pretended to be new 
students at various universities and created fake “Class of 2014” Facebook 
group pages for incoming students at those schools.157  Through this scheme,  
admitted students searching for their university’s official Facebook page 
would instead find a fake Facebook page with the university’s logo, raising 
issues of intellectual property infringement.158  These misrepresentations not 
only had the potential to harm universities and their intellectual property, but 
also individual incoming students through deceptive data collection, by 
stealing identities, and tricking new students into buying items.159  In sum, 
misrepresenting, masquerading, and lying are common in every day social 
networking use.  As of today, however, there is no case or study explicitly 
addressing the application of misrepresentation law to the numerous 
instances of deceit on social networking sites.160 
 
 155.  See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 99, at 1.  British fraud 
investigators have also made use of social networking sites in order to detect whether people are 
lying to get government financial benefits.  Benefits Liars Get Found Out on Facebook: Benefits 
Bosses Are Trawling Profiles on Facebook to Catch Cheats, METRO (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.metro.co.uk/news/594767-benefits-liars-get-found-out-on-facebook. 
 156.  See, e.g., In, supra note 91, at 187 (addressing trademark genericide in the context of the 
Internet and suggesting that the Internet might actually be used to “offset the threat of genericness 
that the Internet presents for . . . protected marks”). 
 157.  Return of the Fake Facebook Class Groups: Are You Ready?, INSIDETIMSHEAD (Oct. 12, 
2009, 11:36 PM), http://insidetimshead.wordpress.com/2009/10/12/return-of-the-fake-facebook-
class-groups-are-you-ready/. 
 158.  See id.  Modernly, a trademark is defined as “a designation used ‘to identify and distinguish’ 
the goods of a person.”  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION 4TH § 3:1 (2011) (citation omitted).  Essentially, trademarks identify a seller’s goods 
and distinguish them from other sources.  Id.  In order for a word or symbol to qualify as a 
trademark, there usually must be: 
(1) [T]he tangible symbol: a word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these; 
(2) type of use: actual adoption and use of the symbol as a mark by a manufacturer or 
seller of goods or services; [and] (3) the function: to identify and distinguish the seller’s 
goods from goods made or sold by others. 
Id. 
 159.  Return of the Fake Facebook Class Groups: Are You Ready?, supra note 157. 
 160.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 130, 138 (mentioning that at least as of 2003, consumers 
had “yet to obtain any tort judgment for misrepresentation or fraud arising out of online 
transactions” and “[n]o certified class of plaintiffs ha[d] recovered for an Internet-related injury due 
to fraudulent advertisements”). 
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III.  LYING TO THE ONLINE COMMUNITY: THE APPLICABILITY OF 
MISREPRESENTATION ACTIONS 
Although misrepresentation covers the law of torts, contracts,161 and 
criminal law, it is still a specific area of the law in the sense that a 
misrepresentation claim is broken down into elements and has traditionally 
been raised in limited contexts.162  With the growth of social networking 
sites, however, online misrepresentation has given rise to a variety of claims 
outside these traditional ways of understanding misrepresentation.163  In 
other words, online deceit has led to a variety of legal implications, but the 
law of misrepresentation has yet to provide a cause of action for such 
misrepresentations.164  Even though the current state of the law does not 
indicate such a trend, traditional misrepresentation law could provide a 
remedy for misrepresentations on social networking sites and be an 
appropriate mechanism for regulating online behavior.165 
A.  Is It a Tort to Lie on Your Social Networking Profile? 
1.  Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
In a successful fraudulent misrepresentation action, several elements 
must be established before recovery is possible.166  For example, there must 
be evidence of some kind of misrepresentation.167  Thus, the first question  is 
whether people on social networking sites assert facts that do not really 
exist. 
 
 161.  As mentioned before, the scope of this Comment does not cover misrepresentation law in the 
context of contract law. 
 162.  See supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 163.  See supra notes 136, 149–59 and accompanying text. 
 164.  See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil 
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (explaining that 
“[t]orts in cyberspace have been slow to develop, partially as the result of tort reform and new 
judicial subsidies benefiting Internet service providers, telecommunications giants and media 
moguls” and arguing that “[t]ort rights and remedies must be strengthened so that they can play their 
traditional social control role in the information age”). 
 165.  See infra text accompanying notes 364–74.  One potential argument in favor of allowing 
recovery in a misrepresentation action for deceit on social networking sites is the fact that people 
generally cannot recover from social networking sites, which are immune under the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”). 
 166.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See supra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
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i. Misrepresentation 
The misrepresentation requirement is easy to satisfy seeing that lying on 
these sites is quite common.168  People often post false information about 
their age, appearance, musical preferences, hobbies, prior work history, and 
educational background.169  On Facebook, people can assert facts that do not 
exist in the simplest of ways by posting false information on their own 
profiles or by creating fake profiles.170 
Of greater concern is when people masquerade behind other identities 
by creating fake profiles171 with false pictures and misleading information—
a common occurrence.172  In La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., for example, a person 
used a fictitious profile on Twitter173 to pretend to be Tony La Russa, the 
 
 168.  See supra notes 136, 149–59 and accompanying text.  Sometimes lying on these sites can 
actually harm the business of another.  See, e.g., Complaint, Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v. Bonnen, 
No. 2009L008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2009).  In Horizon Group Management, LLC v. Bonnen, for 
example, a former tenant posted an allegedly false statement about an apartment leasing and 
management company on her Twitter account.  Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 7.  The statement—“Who said sleeping in 
a moldy apartment was bad for you?  Horizon realty thinks it’s okay”—suggested that the plaintiff 
had its tenants living in moldy apartments.  Id. ¶ 7.  Although the company brought suit for 
defamation, the suit was based on an allegedly false statement made on a social networking site—an 
element that would also have to be established if the suit had been for fraudulent misrepresentation.  
Id. ¶¶ 8–10. 
 169.  Studies suggest that these kinds of lies can be the result of trying to please others or to gain 
social acceptance.  See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 170.  Misrepresentation is so common on Facebook that the site “has tried to reduce the likelihood 
of misrepresentation by maintaining a database of names it believes users could employ to establish 
false identities.”  North, supra note 141, at 1299–300. 
 171.  Many of these fictitious profiles have led to a variety of lawsuits.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 174–80.  In Draker v. Schreiber, for example, several students created a fake 
MySpace profile page for their vice principal.  Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320–21 (Tex. 
App. 2008).  The profile contained the vice principal’s “name, photo, and place of employment, as 
well as explicit and graphic sexual references.”  Id. at 320.  The vice principal sued the students for 
defamation, libel per se, civil conspiracy, and gross negligence.  Id. at 321.  She also sued the parents 
for negligence and gross negligence in failing to supervise the students’ Internet use.  Id.  In trying to 
deal with this kind of behavior, different scholars have proposed potential causes of action that could 
help to regulate fake profiles.  See, e.g., Bradley Kay, Note, Extending Tort Liability to Creators of 
Fake Profiles on Social Networking Websites, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 1 (2010) (discussing 
how suits for misappropriation and the right of publicity “should be extended to false profiles made 
on social networking websites”). 
 172.  “[A]nyone could create multiple identities on Facebook or any other social networking site 
simply by registering with the same name twice and maintaining separate groups of friends on each 
account.  Misrepresentation is possible if a user were to register using someone else’s name and post 
incriminating information.”  North, supra note 141, at 1300; see also infra text accompanying notes 
278–87, 300–05. 
 173.  Twitter is a real-time information network that allows a person to follow conversations on 
different public streams.  About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011).  People use the site to send and read messages that are called Tweets—posts of up to 140 
characters on the user’s profile.  Id.  As of September 2010, the site had 175 million registered users 
with an average of 95 million tweets written each day.  Stacey Santos, Social Media and the Tourism 
Industry Statistics, STIKKY MEDIA, http://www.stikkymedia.com/articles/social-media-and-the-
tourism-industry-statistics (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
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manager of the St. Louis Cardinals.174  The person allegedly stole La Russa’s 
identity and posted tweets175 on the site using his name and photo.176  As 
such, La Russa sued Twitter, Inc. for trademark infringement, invasion of 
privacy, cyber-squatting, and other claims.177  After the suit was filed, 
Twitter removed the fake profile, and La Russa eventually dropped the 
lawsuit.178  Even though this suit was brought for trademark infringement, 
the case emphasizes that even conduct on social networking sites—like 
creating a fake identity—can constitute a “misrepresentation.” 
Not all instances of imposters who create fictitious profiles, however, 
necessarily involve false representations.  In Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 
for example, a health care provider employee created a fake MySpace 
profile titled “Rotten Candy” and disclosed true, but private, information 
about the plaintiff patient—that she had a sexually transmitted disease and a 
sex partner besides her spouse.179  In creating the profile, the employee used 
a photograph of the plaintiff.180  Although the representations in this case 
were accurate, the very masquerading behind a sham profile constitutes the 
misrepresentation.  As mentioned before, “‘[m]asquerading as another 
person certainly could potentially violate several torts,’” and one of these 
torts could be fraudulent misrepresentation.181  In these circumstances where 
there is an imposter on a social network, courts should be more willing to 
find that the “misrepresentation” requirement is satisfied.182  This is 
 
 174.  Complaint ¶¶ 5, 7–8, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 6, 
2009) [hereinafter La Russa Complaint]. 
 175.  See supra text accompanying note 174. 
 176.  La Russa Complaint, supra note 174, ¶ 7. 
 177.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 6.  Although this suit was based on a false profile on Twitter, some social 
networking sites, like Twitter, actually allow fake profiles that are harmless.  See Kay, supra note 
171, at 22 (“Twitter does, however, allow parody accounts that a reasonable person would know is a 
joke.  These policies show that [social networking site] creators contemplated parody profiles and 
made decisions about whether or not the creator of a fake profile should be punished.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 178.  Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy Protection, Safety and Security, 987 PLI/PAT 15, 100 (2009) 
(suggesting that one reason La Russa dropped the suit was because Twitter would likely be immune 
under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)). 
 179.  Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 37–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 180.  Id. at 39. 
 181.  See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 182.  Such a finding would be supported by the literal language of section 525 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and the policy of social networking sites, which discourages fraudulent behavior.  
See, e.g., MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (June 25, 2009), 
http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms (emphasizing that it is a violation of MySpace company 
policy to post content on the site that “promotes information that you know is false or misleading” or 
“includes a photograph or video of another person that you have posted without that person’s 
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supported by the flexible definition of “misrepresentation” under the 
Restatement—written and spoken words, as well as “any other conduct that 
amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the truth.”183 
When a person lies on a social networking site, they are using written 
and spoken words that are not in accordance with the truth.  Similarly, a 
person who masquerades as another displays “conduct” that is not in 
accordance with the truth.  Thus, just as people lie in face-to-face 
communications, they also assert facts that do not really exist on social 
networking sites.184  In order for these lies to be actionable in tort, however, 
further elements must be established. 
ii. Knowledge of Falsity 
The lie told on a social networking site must be fraudulent—one that the 
person knows is false.185  This element is satisfied where a person makes a 
statement on a social networking site and knows or believes it is not as he 
represents it.  For example, if a man represents himself on MySpace as a 
young female looking for friendship and knows that he is actually a fifty-
year-old man, then he knows that his representation is false.  Similarly, if a 
person represents on a dating site186 that he is a doctor or makes a certain 
 
consent”).  As part of its terms of use, Facebook provides that “[y]ou will not provide any false 
personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without 
permission.”  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf.  In fact, Facebook does not allow its users to use the 
site to do “anything unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Even other countries are starting to recognize that masquerading on social networking sites is 
unjustified behavior.  See, e.g., ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 111 
(recommending in a proposed legislation by the European Union that social networking sites comply 
with European Union law by prohibiting people from posting photographs of other people without 
their consent). 
 183.  See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 184.  The anonymous nature of online communication may actually fuel misrepresentations on 
social networking sites.  See supra note 137; see also Bartow, supra note 98, at 428 (“The supposed 
anonymity offered by the Internet brings out the worst in many people.”).  Because the virtual world 
is removed from reality and face-to-face communications, “the body is free of the physical 
constraints and is able to take up multiple identities.”  Murray Watts, Deception and Authenticity.  
How False and Misleading Profiles Are Impacting Online Dating., ONLINE CONFERENCE ON 
NETWORKS AND COMMUNITIES (Apr. 28, 2010), http://networkconference.netstudies.org/2010/04/ 
deception-and-authenticity-how-false-and-misleading-profiles-are-impacting-online-dating-2/. 
 185.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 186.  Online dating has become popular and commonplace today.  See SONALI FERNANDO, 
SOULMATES: TRUE STORIES FROM THE WORLD OF ONLINE DATING (2010) (giving advice for online 
dating in terms of dating etiquette and creating effective profiles).  One of the most popular and 
supposedly reputable online dating sites is Match.com.  See About Match.com, MATCH.COM, 
http://www.match.com/help/aboutus.aspx?lid=4 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  It was launched in 
1995 and now serves twenty-four countries and territories.  Id.  A given profile on the site can 
include up to twenty-six photos and other information about the person.  Id.  Other popular online 
dating sites include eHarmony, Lavalife, OkCupid, and PlentyofFish.  See EHARMONY, 
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salary, when he knows that he does not actually have that occupation or 
salary,187 then he knows “the matter is not as he represents it to be.”188  Other 
instances of fraudulence are more harmful. 
In communicating with others on online dating sites,189 for example, 
some people knowingly misrepresent the status of their venereal illnesses by 
lying and telling potential partners that they do not have any sexually 
transmitted diseases.190  Many courts have recognized a misrepresentation 
action in these circumstances.191  Furthermore, this scienter element can be 
satisfied even if a social networker makes an ambiguous statement subject to 
multiple interpretations192 or an incomplete representation that does not state 
additional qualifying matter.193  Generally, fraudulence is relatively easy to 
establish with lies told on social networks; however, further elements are 
required in order to maintain a successful cause of action. 
iii. Intent to Induce 
The next element for fraudulent misrepresentation requires that the 
misrepresentation on a social networking site be made to induce another to 
act or refrain from acting.194  Because fraudulent misrepresentation actions 
 
http://www.eharmony.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); LAVALIFE, http://www.lavalife.com/ (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2011); OKCUPID, http://www.okcupid.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); 
PLENTYOFFISH, http://www.plentyoffish.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  Many of these sites 
recognize the reality of lying on social networks and thus prohibit such conduct in their terms of use.  
See, e.g., Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/ 
registration/membagr.aspx?lid=4 (last updated Sept. 7, 2011) (Membership can be terminated and 
further legal action taken for content that “promotes information that is false [or] misleading.”).  
Match.com commands that its members “will not provide inaccurate, misleading or false information 
to the [c]ompany or to any other [m]ember.”  Id.  The site specifically prohibits people from 
impersonating another person or entity.  Id. 
 187.  Because “‘[w]omen tend to desire men who have a high socioeconomic status,’” it is 
common for men to lie about their professions on online dating sites.  See Watts, supra note 184 
(citation omitted).  Similarly, it is common for women to misrepresent their weight or age or to use 
photographs that distort the reality of their appearance.  Id. 
 188.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). 
 189.  Some dating sites, like www.positivesingles.com, actually cater to people with sexually 
transmitted diseases by allowing users to find and date others with the same condition.  See POSITIVE 
SINGLES, www.positivesingles.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 190.  See Watts, supra note 184 (discussing how false profiles in the context of online dating can 
have negative consequences). 
 191.  See Mekel, infra note 226, at 943 (“[C]ourts specifically have focused on a plaintiff’s ability 
to show the defendant’s knowledge of or belief in his or her diseased condition . . . .”). 
 192.  See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 193.  See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 194.  See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
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traditionally have been maintained in instances that involve a transaction 
resulting in economic loss,195 a plaintiff can likely establish the intent to 
induce requirement where the misrepresentation on a social networking site 
includes some kind of transaction.196  These cases will usually involve the 
use of certain social networking features that facilitate business between 
users.197  Thus, the use of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim will allow 
courts to appropriately regulate online behavior while simultaneously 
ensuring that liability will be limited to specific circumstances involving 
business transactions. 
When the misrepresentation on a social networking site merely involves 
a fake profile or general lies,198 there may be issues as to whether the intent 
to induce requirement is satisfied.  In these cases, the crucial problem is that 
the profiles are often addressed to a wide audience and not to any person in 
particular.199  Essentially, it is not clear who is intended to be induced by the 
misrepresentation—an essential element to maintain a successful fraudulent 
misrepresentation action.200  A plaintiff may try to avoid these problems by 
arguing that the defendant had “reason to expect” that the plaintiff would act 
 
 195.  See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 196.  One instance where this arguably may be the case is where people post information about 
their apartment or one of their items on a social networking feature like the Facebook Marketplace.  
See infra note 197.  It is not uncommon for people to scam others through this Facebook feature in 
ways that are intended to induce others to act.  See Facebook Marketplace Scam’s, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=22114954117#!/group.php?gid=22114954117&v=info 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (a Facebook group page dedicated to “spread[ing] the awareness of the 
mass amounts of scamming going on in the marketplace”).  Some Facebook Marketplace users, for 
example, have complained about selling items to buyers in West Africa who alleged that they would 
pay through PayPal, a business that allows for global e-commerce by enabling its members to make 
payments and money transfers through its services.  Id.; see Welcome to the Press Center, PAYPAL, 
https://www.paypal-media.com/who (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  In the end, the seller discovers that 
he has been the victim of a scam and is never paid for his items.  See Facebook Marketplace Scam’s, 
supra.  Assuming that such transactions and posts on the Marketplace are fraudulent 
misrepresentations, it is easy to see how they are made to induce others to act—to have them send 
their items to the defrauding buyer.  See id. 
 197.  The Facebook Marketplace, for example, is a feature that allows users to post free classified 
advertisements.  Marketplace, FACEBOOK, http://apps.facebook.com/marketplace/?cm_mmc_o= 
PBBLFzyLCjC_BBLFzyLCjC_BBLFzyLCjCtBFw&ref=bookmarks&count=5 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011).  Some of the categories available for posting these ads include For Sale, Housing, and Other.  
Id.  The Marketplace even has a “Jobs” section where people can search for jobs by location and key 
terms.  Id. 
 198.  See supra notes 171–82 and accompanying text. 
 199.  See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 200.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 cmt. b (1977) (“If the maker neither intends 
nor has reason to expect that the misrepresentation will reach a particular person or class of persons 
or that they will act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it, the fact that it does reach them and 
they do so act does not [support a finding of liability].” (emphasis added)).  Regardless, it might be 
the case that this intent to induce requirement can still be satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he 
was a person who the defendant had a “reason to expect” to act or refrain from acting.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 45–46. 
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or refrain from acting.201  Moreover, the plaintiff can argue that there are 
circumstances in which non-transactional communications on social 
networking sites can be sufficiently directed to one person to meet the intent 
to induce requirement.202  This does not mean that the connection between 
the people communicating through social media has to rise to the level of a 
confidential relationship in order to establish this element.203  Certainly, an 
online stranger can still be liable to another for fraudulent misrepresentation 
so long as that stranger intended to induce another user. 
In light of the various statutes that criminalize misrepresentations on 
social networking sites, it would be entirely reasonable for courts to find that 
elements like “intent to induce” in a civil cause of action can be satisfied 
without too stringent of requirements.204  Such an approach would be 
desirable because it would provide civil recourse to a person harmed by 
social networking abuse—a potentially beneficial and more lenient 
alternative to criminalizing online speech.205  Overall, a misrepresentation 
should be one that involves some kind of transaction on a social networking 
site or one that is sufficiently directed to a particular person or audience in 
order to establish “intent to induce.”206  This is one of the crucial ways in 
which courts can maintain a balance in regulating online deceit while 
ensuring that misrepresentation law is not expanded to the point of unlimited 
liability.  Even so, the context in which the misrepresentation takes place—
transactional or personal—should not dictate recovery.  Rather, the guiding 
principle should be that the law penalizes fraud in certain circumstances 
because society tends “to think of deliberate deception—fraud—as a grave 
moral wrong.”207  This is yet another important factor to be balanced in the 
 
 201.  See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 202.  For example, “[t]he private messaging function on Facebook is sufficiently similar to e-mail 
communications” to make it so that the communication is clearly between two people.  North, supra 
note 141, at 1300.  “As with e-mail, the site’s user-to-user interface allows messages to be sent to a 
single recipient or several recipients.”  Id.  Thus, if a misrepresentation that otherwise meets the 
elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation is made through a private message, it is arguable that the 
intent to induce requirement can be satisfied.  See id. 
 203.  See B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Md. 1988) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 557A cmt. a (1977)) (finding that “the existence of a confidential relationship [was] not 
essential to [the plaintiff’s] cause of action for fraud” because the defendant “had a general tort 
duty”). 
 204.  See supra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 205.  See supra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 206.  See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text. 
 207.  Sherwin, supra note 33, at 1017.  Moreover, a legal remedy is appropriately based on the 
rationale that “[d]eception denies the autonomy of the person deceived and undermines the 
foundation of trust in human interaction.”  Id. 
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totality of circumstances when courts decide if misrepresentation law should 
provide a successful cause of action.208  This standard should be kept in 
mind in deciding whether the next element, justifiable reliance, is satisfied. 
iv. Justifiable Reliance 
In addition to the intent to induce requirement, there must also be actual 
and justified reliance209—possibly the most difficult element to fulfill—
which guarantees that courts regulating online behavior through 
misrepresentation law would not do so without limitations.  With 
misrepresentations on social networking sites that involve some type of 
transaction,210 the actual reliance occurs when people act or refrain from 
acting as a result of the representation.211  However, it is not certain whether 
such reliance is justified even if people do actually rely on the 
misrepresentation. 
Generally, relying on representations made on social networking sites 
may be unjustified given the very nature of anonymous online speech.212  
Even if the identity of the speaker is known, a person who uses a social 
networking site may bear a certain level of risk in that he or she should know 
that people do not always tell the truth on these sites—the very nature of 
these sites might make it so that reliance is not justified.  However, if a 
 
 208.  See supra text accompanying notes 132–33. 
 209.  See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.  In Seit-Olsen v. Reliance Appraisals, LLC, for 
example, the court found that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for fraudulent 
misrepresentation because she could not prove reliance on an Internet listing concerning the size of a 
home and room for a two-car garage.  Seit-Olsen v. Reliance Appraisals, LLC, No. 264470, 2006 
WL 1113936, at *3–4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 210.  Actual and justified reliance is not limited to representations made in commercial 
transactions.  See infra note 213 and accompanying text.  One instance where courts have recognized 
fraudulent misrepresentation actions even though there is no business exchange is when a person 
relies on another’s assurance that they do not have any venereal diseases—a very private matter that 
does not involve any kind of business transaction.  Barke, supra note 33, at 204–05.  Given the 
popularity of online dating, many people may now be relying on a prospective lover’s online 
statement about their sexually transmitted diseases. 
 211.  In the case of misrepresentations made on Facebook Marketplace, for example, a person will 
actually buy or sell an item or possibly sublease an apartment in reliance on the fraudulent assertion.  
See supra note 196. 
 212.  Many social networking sites imply that reliance on statements made by other users may be 
unjustified.  See, e.g., Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 186 (“Opinions, advice, 
statements, offers, or other information or content made available through the [s]ervice . . . should 
not necessarily be relied upon.”).  Reliance may be further unjustified because “it is [often] very 
difficult to locate and sue people for their speech on the Internet.  Much speech on the Internet is 
anonymous, it may be difficult to locate the person who is speaking, or the person may be overseas.”  
Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 434 (2009).  
However, it is arguable that social networking sites actually foster speech that is connected to an 
identified speaker by encouraging people to use their true identities when creating online profiles.  
See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff can establish that the misrepresentation was objectively or 
subjectively material, then reliance is justified.213  Moreover, it may be the 
case that reliance should not even be required in the context of social 
networking dishonesty—state statutes have carved out exceptions for 
specific misrepresentations that are illegal and do not have to comply with 
the strict requirements of fraudulent misrepresentation.214  Given the current 
state of the law, however, reliance is a required element, and it is likely that 
reliance will be more reasonable when the misrepresentation involves some 
kind of transaction or is directed to a particular person, but not when it 
merely involves a general lie.215  Even if courts find reliance, there must be 
recoverable damages to bring the deceit within the scope of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
 
 213.  See supra text accompanying note 50.  For example, if a misrepresentation is unrelated to 
any kind of transaction on a social networking site, reliance may still be justified where the plaintiff 
can establish that a reasonable man would rely on the misrepresentation in deciding to act, or that the 
defendant knew the plaintiff would likely consider the misrepresentation in deciding to act.  To 
successfully meet this requirement, the plaintiff will have to plead the facts with particularity.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud . . . a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud . . . .”).  Given this heightened pleading requirement, a conclusory statement that 
there was justifiable reliance, without more, is not enough.  See id. 
 214.  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5 (West 2006).  In addressing 
misrepresentations in commercial e-mail advertisements, California state law provides for recovery 
without proof of reliance or actual damages.  Id.; see also Asis Internet Servs. v. 
Consumerbargaingiveaways, LLC, 622 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Section 17529.5(a) 
does not . . . purport to require reliance or actual damages . . . .”).  Specifically, the law makes it 
“unlawful for any person or entity to advertise in a commercial e-mail advertisement[,] either sent 
from California or sent to a California electronic mail address,” an “e-mail advertisement [that] 
contains or is accompanied by falsified, misrepresented, or forged header information.”  CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(2) (West 2006).  It is further unlawful to make these kinds of 
advertisements where “[t]he e-mail advertisement has a subject line that a person knows would be 
likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact 
regarding the contents or subject matter of the message.”  Id. § 17529.5(a)(3).  If it is possible to 
allow recovery without proof of reliance in this context, it might be reasonable to do the same for 
misrepresentations on social networking sites, where commercial advertisements are currently on the 
rise.  See Debra Aho Williamson, Social Networking Ad Spending Update, EMARKETER (May 13, 
2008), http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1006278 (estimating that money spent on social 
networking advertisements will reach $2.6 billion in 2012). 
 215.  It would be unwarranted, for example, to sue a person for fraudulently misrepresenting their 
age or appearance—a potentially immaterial representation—on a social network.  See supra text 
accompanying note 49. 
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v. Damages 
For a social networking lie to be considered a tortious and fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the lie must result in pecuniary loss216 or physical harm.217  
Generally, a misrepresentation made on a social networking site can cause 
the same damage as misrepresentations made in other contexts.  A person 
can be harmed economically,218 physically,219 or emotionally220 by a lie that 
is told on an online profile.221  Assuming that there is justifiable reliance on a 
misrepresentation that a social network user intended to induce another, 
there should be liability in tort so long as there was some cognizable injury. 
Although some may argue that fraudulent misrepresentation actions 
should be limited to recovery for pecuniary loss under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 525 or for physical harm under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 310, this ignores the reality that many courts have 
actually allowed emotional distress recovery for fraudulent 
misrepresentations.222  Thus, in these jurisdictions, there is no reason to 
prohibit a person who justifiably relied on another’s fraudulent assertions on 
Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter from recovering for emotional distress.223 
Similarly, recovery should not be automatically precluded merely 
because the damage caused by a social networking interaction is unrelated to 
 
 216.  See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 217.  See supra text accompanying note 54. 
 218.  It is possible that a lie someone tells on a social networking site could in fact cause another 
to suffer economic loss when the statement is made in some kind of business interaction.  See supra 
note 196. 
 219.  See, e.g., infra notes 278–305 and accompanying text. 
 220.  For example, a person can be emotionally distressed where false information is posted 
online about their personal sexual activities.  See, e.g., Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 
34, 37–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (describing that the defendant created a fake MySpace profile to 
spread information about the plaintiff’s sexually transmitted diseases). 
 221.  See supra notes 169–83 and accompanying text. 
 222.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 223.  Some examples where a person can suffer emotional distress are when a rumor is spread on 
an online profile or when cyberbullying involves a fraudulent statement.  See State Cyberstalking, 
Cyberharassment and Cyberbullying Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13495 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (“[C]yberbullying is used 
for electronic harassment or bullying among minors within a school context.”).  Cyberbullying is a 
common occurrence, especially among younger teenagers, where people maliciously make 
fraudulent statements online and on social networking sites to cause emotional distress to another 
person.  See id.  In these cases, the problem with allowing recovery in tort is that it may not be 
possible to prove actual or justifiable reliance.  See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.  Thus, a 
fraudulent misrepresentation action would not be appropriate where reliance cannot be established.  
Regardless, current cyberbullying laws provide adequate mechanisms for regulating this kind of 
behavior.  See State Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment and Cyberbullying Laws, supra (explaining 
that current cyberbullying laws make “school districts the policy enforcers of such misconduct” and 
establish “sanctions for cyberbullying [that] range from school/parent interventions to misdemeanors 
and felonies with detention, suspension, and expulsion in between”). 
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any commercial transaction.224  Although “[i]t is true that [the] tort [of 
fraudulent misrepresentation] is usually applied in a business setting, or to 
one in which some pecuniary loss is claimed, . . . a business setting and 
pecuniary loss are not necessarily required.”225  In fact, many jurisdictions 
allow misrepresentation claims in personal, noncommercial settings that 
cause physical harm or impair one’s health.226  Just as a sexually transmitted 
disease227 or an induced marriage228 can be a cognizable injury within the 
scope of recoverable damages, economic loss,229 emotional distress,230 and 
physical harm231 caused by dishonesty on social networking sites should all 
meet the requisite damages requirement.232  This would guarantee that 
 
 224.  See infra text accompanying notes 226–32. 
 225.  B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1182 (Md. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 226.  See, e.g., id. (allowing recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation where the resulting damage 
was the contraction of a contagious sexually transmitted disease); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 273, 276 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasizing that “contagious and dangerous diseases,” like genital 
herpes, are injuries that are within the scope of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation).  See also 
Michele L. Mekel, Kiss and Tell: Making the Case for the Tortious Transmission of Herpes and 
Human Papillomavirus: Deuschle v. Jobe, 66 MO. L. REV. 929, 929 (2001) (discussing tortious 
transmission cases involving genital herpes and human papillomavirus and arguing that there should 
be liability in tort for these wrongful transmission actions).  In addition to representations as to the 
status of one’s venereal disease, courts have also recognized fraudulent misrepresentation claims for 
damages caused by other personal, noncommercial representations—when statements are made 
regarding sterility or birth control.  See, e.g., Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (allowing a cause of action for deceit where a woman suffered injuries from an ectopic 
pregnancy resulting from intercourse with an attorney who falsely stated, “I can’t possibly get 
anyone pregnant”). 
 227.  See supra note 226. 
 228.  See Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675, 676 (N.Y. 1933) (finding that damages were 
recoverable where they were based on fraudulent misrepresentations made by the plaintiff’s father-
in-law and sister-in-law inducing the plaintiff to marry her husband and where the damages were for 
her change in status “from a single woman to a married woman, [loss of] . . . consortium, attentions, 
and support of a well man, and endured mental pain and anguish as well as humiliation from being 
bound in matrimony to an invalid and a drug addict”). 
 229.  See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 230.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 231.  The most tragic form of physical harm that can result is death.  See Chris V. Thangham, 
Mother Blames Social Networking Website Bebo for Death of 13-Year-Old Son, DIGITAL JOURNAL 
(June 14, 2008), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/256115 (recounting the death of a thirteen-
year-old boy who committed suicide after being repeatedly bullied on a social networking site).  In 
these cases, however, recovery will not be likely because it requires proving that the cause of death 
(i.e., bullying) involved some kind of misrepresentation.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
310 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 232.  Depending on the nature of the damages—pecuniary loss or physical harm—there can be 
recovery either under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 525 or Restatement (Second) of 
Torts section 310, assuming that there was justified reliance on a misrepresentation.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
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people do not abuse social networking sites and avoid liability based on 
trivial technicalities.  In addition to a cause of action based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation, there may be recovery in tort for negligent 
misrepresentations made on social networking profiles. 
2.  Negligent Misrepresentation 
Under a negligence standard of liability, there may be a successful cause 
of action for damages caused by a social network user’s negligent speech.233 
i. Doe v. MySpace, Inc.: A Model for Future Negligent 
Misrepresentation Actions 
In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., the plaintiffs, a mother and her teenage 
daughter, brought suit against MySpace for negligent misrepresentation.234  
The suit alleged that MySpace failed to implement safety measures to 
protect minors from sexual predators on the site235—something that was 
assured by MySpace in its representations.236  In addition to the public 
statements that MySpace made to emphasize the safety of the site for its 
younger users,237 it also made representations on the site itself in the “Terms 
and Conditions” and “Tips for Parents” sections.238  Specifically, the 
following representations were made: (1) “it is ‘illegal’ or ‘prohibited’ to 
‘solicit personal information from anyone under 18,’” and (2) “‘MySpace 
 
 233.  See Weingarten, supra note 52, at 752 (arguing that misrepresentation law is the “most 
appropriate [tort standard] for [regulating] nonlibelous negligent statements”). 
 234.  Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008).  The suit also involved claims for 
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and gross negligence against MySpace.  Id.  Further claims 
for sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress were brought against an individual 
defendant.  Id.  Originally, the suit was filed against MySpace, its parent company, and an individual 
defendant in Texas state court.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  See id. 
 237.  For example, MySpace representatives made the following representations to CBS News: 
There are a number of specific procedures and policies in place to ensure users of all ages 
have a safe and meaningful experience.  These include limiting use of the website to 
users who are at least 14 years of age and providing special protections to users who are 
under 16 so that their personal information cannot be accessed by persons they do not 
know. 
Complaint ¶ 26, Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. D-1-GN-06-002209) 
[hereinafter MySpace Complaint].  MySpace’s parent company also publicly represented the 
following: “‘We’re being very proactive . . . .  We plan to reach out further to school principals, 
church groups and community organizations to educate them on the safety measures we’ve 
developed.’”  Report: Rupert Murdoch to take on CNBC, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11199184/ (last updated Feb. 6, 2006).  For example, no one under 
fourteen is allowed on the site, and there are strict limits on who can access profiles of users under 
sixteen.  See MySpace Complaint, supra, ¶ 26. 
 238.  MySpace Complaint, supra note 237, ¶ 27. 
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members must be 14 years of age or older.’”239  Despite these 
representations, the plaintiffs alleged that underage users were still contacted 
and sexually assaulted by adult users.240 
The plaintiffs argued that a negligent misrepresentation action was 
appropriate because: (1) “[Defendants] made express and implied 
representations to Plaintiffs in the course of MySpace’s business and/or 
during transactions in which [Defendants] had an interest;” (2) 
“[Defendants] knew or should have known that Plaintiffs were members of 
the class of persons that would receive their false and material 
representations;” (3) “These false and material representations included 
misstatements of material facts and were made in regard to the security and 
safety of MySpace for young underage MySpace users;” (4) “[Defendants] 
supplied this false information for the guidance of others and Plaintiffs in 
their business;” and (5) “[Defendants] did not exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining and/or communicating information regarding the 
safety and security of MySpace for young underage MySpace users.”241  The 
plaintiffs further pled that there was justifiable reliance on the negligent 
misrepresentations that led to injury—the then thirteen-year-old242 plaintiff 
was contacted by a nineteen-year-old male MySpace user who sexually 
assaulted her.243 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of 
immunity under the Communications Decency Act,244 and further asserted 
that the negligent misrepresentation claim did not meet the heightened 
pleading standard of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).245  The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the 
negligent misrepresentation claim without prejudice because it was not pled 
with sufficient particularity and because the plaintiffs admitted that they did 
 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. ¶¶ 19, 28. 
 241.  Id. ¶¶ 74–76. 
 242.  Although MySpace represented that no one under the age of fourteen could use the site, the 
plaintiff was able to make a profile when she was only thirteen years old.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 243.  Id. ¶¶ 30–35. 
 244.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”).  “[T]he Act provides interactive computer services with immunity” in order to 
protect them from being “crippled by lawsuits arising out of third-party communications.”  Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 245.  Doe, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 
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not want to further pursue the claim.246  The decision was reaffirmed by the 
Fifth Circuit.247  Doe v. MySpace, Inc. foreshadows the possibility of future 
lawsuits for negligent misrepresentations made on social networking sites.248 
In cases similar to Doe v. MySpace, Inc., suits can be brought against 
individual users, rather than social networking sites, to avoid being barred by 
the Communications Decency Act.249  Although the merits of the negligent 
misrepresentation claim were never determined in Doe v. MySpace,250 the 
claim may have been successful if it had been pled with sufficient 
particularity and the plaintiffs had not voluntarily dismissed.251  Essentially, 
the claim was dismissed on procedural grounds—not because negligent 
speech on a social networking site is not actionable under negligent 
misrepresentation.252 
Doe v. MySpace may be a model for future negligent misrepresentation 
actions that are limited to pecuniary loss and involve commercial 
transactions on social networking sites.253  For a lie to be actionable, it must 
first be made in the course of the defendant’s “business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary 
interest.”254  In the context of social networking sites, this will almost always 
mean that a commercial transaction is involved—a requirement that 
appropriately limits liability and should thus encourage courts to apply 
misrepresentation law as a mechanism for regulating online behavior.  For 
example, the plaintiffs in Doe v. MySpace would not be able to sue the 
nineteen-year-old sex offender for negligent misrepresentation because he 
was not making any representations in a business, professional, or 
employment capacity.255  He also did not have a pecuniary interest in any 
 
 246.  Id. at 851.  Essentially, the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their negligent misrepresentation 
claim.  See id.  The fraudulent misrepresentation claim was dismissed on the same grounds.  Id.  The 
plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence claims were dismissed with prejudice on the grounds that 
they were barred by the Communications Decency Act and Texas common law.  Id. at 847–52. 
 247.  Doe, 528 F.3d at 422. 
 248.  See id. 
 249.  See supra note 165. 
 250.  See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See Doe, 528 F.3d at 422. 
 252.  See id.  “Applying negligence principles to speech-based liability issues is not unusual.  For 
instance, negligence is commonly applied as a fault standard in defamation law when the plaintiff is 
a private person.”  Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers 
& Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 210, 231 (2009). 
 253.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).  The plaintiffs relied on a negligent 
misrepresentation claim, as codified by section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating that 
there were allegations of representations made “in the course of . . . business” meant “for the 
guidance of others and [p]laintiffs in their business.”  Id. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  See supra notes 231–38 and accompanying text. 
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transaction.256  Because most negligent misrepresentations on social 
networks are made in a personal and non-transactional setting, recovery will 
likely be rare for economic harm.257  However, if the statement is made in 
communications like those made on the Facebook Marketplace, then this 
requirement would be satisfied.258 
Assuming that the online speech involves some kind of transaction, in 
which case it will likely meet the first requirement, the false information 
must also be made “for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions.”259  This is yet another reason why recovery under section 552 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts will likely be limited to cases where 
there is a commercial transaction on a social networking site.  Recovery 
would be further restricted to pecuniary loss.260  Moreover, the negligent 
speech will not be actionable unless there is proof that there was justifiable 
reliance, and the maker of the representation failed “to exercise reasonable 
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.”261  
Given these requirements, there will be no liability for negligent speech on a 
social networking site that causes economic harm unless the representation 
was made in the course of some online business transaction.  All of these 
limitations should assure courts that applying misrepresentation law to 
online deceit will not result in an unnecessary expansion of the tort of 
misrepresentation.  However, a plaintiff can still avoid these limitations by 
bringing suit for negligent speech that causes physical harm. 
 
 256.  See supra notes 231–38 and accompanying text. 
 257.  In the following illustration, the Restatement (Second) of Torts emphasizes that there can be 
no recovery where the misrepresentation is neither made in a business, professional, or employment 
capacity, nor in a transaction where the defendant has a pecuniary interest: 
The A Newspaper negligently publishes in one of its columns a statement that a certain 
proprietary drug is a sure cure for dandruff.  B, who is plagued with dandruff, reads the 
statement and in reliance upon it purchases a quantity of the drug.  It proves to be 
worthless as a dandruff cure and B suffers pecuniary loss.  The A Newspaper is not liable 
to B. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. c, illus. 2 (1977).  In this example, the newspaper has 
no pecuniary interest in any transaction.  See id. 
 258.  See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 259.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). 
 260.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
 261.  Id. 
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ii. Negligent Online Speech Causing Physical Harm 
If a person negligently provides false information on a social 
networking site,262 there can be liability for any resulting physical injuries.263  
The first question that must be considered is whether the statement was 
made in a business or professional capacity.264  Most communications on 
social networking sites are not made in such a capacity.  Given that the 
primary purpose of these websites is to connect friends and family, most of 
the online interactions are personal in nature.265  However, this does not 
necessarily bar recovery because section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts does not actually require that the statement be made in a business or 
professional capacity266—although this is usually the case.  Thus, if a person 
negligently speaks267 on a social networking site and another user reasonably 
relies on the statement, there can be recovery if further elements are 
satisfied. 
The plaintiff has to be the recipient of the false information that is 
communicated online, or a third person whom the social network user—the 
defendant—”should expect to be put in peril.”268  The following example is 
 
 262.  It is debatable whether this should be viewed as unpublished or published negligent 
misrepresentations.  See Weingarten, supra note 52, at 756–57 (discussing the application of 
misrepresentation law to negligent oral speech and arguing that the same approach should be taken 
with negligent published speech).  In personal communications between two people, it seems that 
statements on social networking sites are best viewed as unpublished negligent misrepresentations 
because they involve the negligent use of language.  See id.  However, if a statement is generally 
posted on a profile, it is also arguable that this constitutes a “publication.”  See id. 
 263.  See supra text accompanying note 61.  Recovery is more likely under section 311 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts for physical harm than under section 552 for pecuniary loss—in the 
latter case “the courts have found it necessary to adopt a more restricted rule of liability.”  Randi W. 
v. Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 477 (Ct. App. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). 
 264.  See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 265.  See supra notes 100, 143 and accompanying text. 
 266.  See supra text accompanying note 73.  See also Randi W., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477–78 
(“‘Misrepresentations involving a risk of physical harm constitute an exception to the ordinary rule 
that ‘liability [for negligent misrepresentations] is imposed only on those who supply information for 
business purposes in the course of a business or profession.’  The ordinary rule is based on the 
principle that, in financial matters, a plaintiff ‘cannot expect the defendant to exercise the same 
degree of care [in social meetings] as he would when acting in a business or professional capacity.’’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 267.  Some courts have even suggested that half-truths or failing to disclose can constitute “false 
information” under section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See Randi W., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 478 (finding that letters of recommendation making positive assertions about a vice principal who 
sexually assaulted the plaintiff constituted “false information” even though none of the letters 
affirmatively stated that he was never “suspected or accused of any improper sexual misconduct with 
female students or that he [was] free of negative character traits”). 
 268.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  See also Randi W., 929 P.2d at 591 (affirming 
that the plaintiff, a student who was sexually assaulted by her vice principal, was a third party who 
could recover for negligent misrepresentation even though the negligent misrepresentations were 
made to her school and not to her personally). 
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instructive: a person (A) acts as matchmaker and introduces two of her 
friends (B and C) to one another through MySpace.269  By means of online 
communications, she assures B that C is a decent person and would make a 
great match.270  If C had a record of domestic violence and A knew this or 
could have easily ascertained that this was the case, then B could arguably 
bring suit against A for physical harm inflicted by C.  Under section 311 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, B was the recipient of A’s negligent 
speech and suffered physical harm.271  Even if the communication was made 
generally to the online community and not directly to A, A may still be able 
to recover given that “[a] victim of physical violence need not rely on the 
negligent misrepresentation, or even be a party to it . . . .”272 
Given concerns for unlimited liability and free speech rights, certain 
restrictions can be placed on liability for negligent speech on social 
networking sites.  For example, liability can be limited to when there is a 
duty owed to the person harmed by the online statement.273  Thus, liability 
would not extend to just anyone who is harmed by a representation made on 
a social networking site.274  Even so, it is unclear what would actually satisfy 
this duty requirement—it is possible that online friendship would create a 
sufficient relationship between the person harmed and the maker of the 
representation to give rise to a duty.275  Overall, in deciding whether liability 
for negligent misrepresentations made on social networking sites is 
appropriate, courts should consider the gravity of harm involved and the 
reprehensibility of the false information—balancing these factors in a 
 
 269.  Some people actually provide professional matchmaking services online.  See Who We Are, 
MASTER MATCHMAKERS, http://www.mastermatchmakers.com/about-us (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) 
(providing personal coaching and matchmaking services to bring couples together).  Although these 
sites are businesses and not freely accessible to the public, they may qualify as social networking 
sites given their purpose of facilitating connections and communications between people. 
 270.  These positive assurances are similar to negligent letters of recommendation that courts have 
found actionable.  See Davis v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1180 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding that letters recommending a person, who allegedly sexually abused the plaintiff, as an 
“‘excellent employee’” were actionable for negligent misrepresentation). 
 271.  See supra text accompanying note 71.  What qualifies as physical harm varies by 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891 (D. 
Minn. 1999) (finding that although rape would fall within the scope of the physical harm 
requirement, “less brutally invasive sexual assault” may not). 
 272.  Davis, 987 P.2d at 1180. 
 273.  Some jurisdictions have interpreted section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to 
include such a duty.  See, e.g., Grozdanich, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (interpreting section 311 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts to include “‘a duty of reasonable care in conveying information’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 274.  See id. 
 275.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). 
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totality of the circumstances would allow courts to apply misrepresentation 
law as a regulatory mechanism in limited cases.276  The same principles 
should guide whether criminalizing dishonesty is appropriate. 
B.  Is It a Crime to Lie on Your Social Networking Profile? 
Several states have already criminalized lying on social networking 
sites.277  These laws suggest that those guilty of misrepresentation who have 
gone unpunished in the past would not be so lucky today in some 
jurisdictions. 
1.  Revisiting United States v. Drew and the Case of Elizabeth Thrasher 
i. United States v. Drew 
In United States v. Drew, a forty-seven-year-old woman, Lori Drew, 
was found guilty of a misdemeanor for creating a fake MySpace profile 
through which she eventually caused a thirteen-year-old girl, Megan Meier, 
to commit suicide.278  Drew lived in the same city as Megan, who was a 
former classmate of Drew’s daughter.279  As part of a conspiracy against 
Megan, Drew and other conspirators created a fake MySpace profile for a 
fictitious sixteen-year-old boy named “Josh Evans.”280  The conspiracy was 
formed “for the purpose of committing the tortious act of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”281  As part of this conspiracy, Drew posted 
a photo of a boy without his knowledge or consent, and used the fake profile 
to flirt with Megan.282  Less than one month after communicating online 
with Megan, “Josh” told her that he did not like her and that “‘the world 
would be a better place without her in it.’”283  On that same day, Megan 
committed suicide by hanging herself in her bedroom closet.284  Later that 
day, Drew deleted the fake MySpace profile.285  Although a jury found Drew 
 
 276.  See supra text accompanying notes 150–52. 
 277.  See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text. 
 278.  United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452–53 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 279.  Id. at 452. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 284.  Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger But No Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html. 
 285.  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452. 
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guilty of a misdemeanor for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act,286 her motion for acquittal was granted.287 
Under current Texas or California law, Drew’s fake MySpace profile 
would have caused her to be guilty of a third degree felony288 or imprisoned 
for up to one year with a fine of $1000.289  Under both laws, it is a crime to 
impersonate another person through a social networking site.290  Here, Drew 
clearly impersonated another person, a sixteen-year-old boy named “Josh 
Evans.”291  She created an entire profile with “Josh’s” picture, and this was 
all done without the boy’s consent292—a requirement under both laws.293  
Moreover, she created the fake profile to inflict intentional emotional 
distress on Megan.294  This would satisfy the requirement that the 
impersonation be for the purpose of harming another.295  Under California 
law, Drew’s MySpace profile would also have to have been “credible.”296  
This element would be met because Megan clearly “did reasonably 
believe”297 that Drew was “Josh Evans.”298  Thus, under modern laws like 
those in Texas and California, Drew would have committed a crime by 
creating a fake MySpace profile.299  Cases involving similar facts would be 
appropriately criminalized today. 
 
 286.  Under this law, a misdemeanor crime involves three elements: (1) “the defendant 
intentionally [accessed without authorization] [exceeded authorized access of] a computer;” (2) “the 
defendant’s access of the computer involved an interstate or foreign communication;” and (3) “by 
[accessing without authorization] [exceeding authorized access to] a computer, the defendant 
obtained information from a computer . . . [used in interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication].”  Id. at 457 (citing NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 8.79 
(2003) (alteration in original)). 
 287.  Id. at 468. 
 288.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
 289.  See supra text accompanying note 86. 
 290.  See supra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 291.  See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452–53. 
 292.  Id. at 452. 
 293.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82, 85. 
 294.  See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452–53.  The purpose or intent requirement could also be met if the 
impersonation was to defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 81–82, 85. 
 295.  See supra text accompanying notes 82, 85. 
 296.  See supra text accompanying note 87. 
 297.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 298.  See supra text accompanying note 284. 
 299.  Under Texas law, Drew would be guilty of a third degree felony.  See supra text 
accompanying note 81.  Under California law, she could have been imprisoned up to one year in a 
county jail and/or fined up to $1000.  See supra text accompanying notes 84–86. 
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ii. The Case of Elizabeth Thrasher 
In 2009, Elizabeth Thrasher, a forty-year-old woman, was charged with 
felony harassment for posting information about a seventeen-year-old girl on 
the “Casual Encounters” section of Craigslist.300  The seventeen-year-old 
victim was “the daughter of the [current] girlfriend of Thrasher’s ex-
husband.”301  Thrasher posted the girl’s personal information—picture, e-
mail address, and photo—in such a way that suggested she was looking for a 
sexual encounter.302  As a result, the teenager was contacted by strange men 
who had her personal information and sent her vulgar messages and 
photos.303  Although Thrasher was charged with felony harassment,304 she 
was freed on a $10,000 bond.305 
Under criminal laws like those in Texas and California,306 Thrasher 
would be found guilty of a crime just because she impersonated another 
person on a social networking site.307  First, she used the persona of a 
seventeen-year-old girl to create a misleading post on Craigslist.308  She 
specifically used the girl’s pictures and contact information without her 
consent.309  Second, although it is not clear that she created the post to 
intimidate, threaten, or defraud anyone, she arguably intended to harm the 
girl.310  This is evident from the circumstances surrounding the post’s 
creation—Thrasher had been arguing with the girl earlier on MySpace 
before creating the Craigslist post.311  Moreover, the girl was the daughter of 
Thrasher’s ex-husband’s current girlfriend.312  All of this suggests that 
Thrasher intended to harm the girl.313  Under California law, the post was 
also “credible” because other men did in fact believe that Thrasher was a 
 
 300.  Kirtley, supra note 178, at 105–06. 
 301.  Id. at 106. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Thrasher was the first woman to be charged with felony harassment under Missouri’s 
cyberbullying law, which was passed after the death of Megan Meier.  Id. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–90. 
 307.  See Kirtley, supra note 178, at 106.  Under these laws, Thrasher’s attorney was incorrect to 
assume that such actions did not amount to a crime because they were merely akin to “someone 
posting a telephone number on a bathroom wall.”  Id.  Clearly, state legislatures have decided that 
such conduct on social networking sites is in fact criminal.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–
90. 
 308.  See Kirtley, supra note 178, at 105–06. 
 309.  See id. 
 310.  See id. 
 311.  Id. at 106. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  See id. 
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seventeen-year-old girl.314  Thus, in Texas, Thrasher would be guilty of a 
third degree felony,315 and in California she would be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and spend up to one year in jail.316  In addition to past cases 
involving people like Lori Drew and Elizabeth Thrasher, modern criminal 
laws will also have implications for future cases that are already being filed 
for social networking misrepresentations. 
2.  Predicting the Outcome of Full Sail, Inc. v. Does 
On January 21, 2011, a corporation, Full Sail, Inc.,317 and its president, 
Garry Jones, brought suit against unknown defendants for creating three fake 
accounts on Twitter.318  The defendants allegedly pretended to be Jones and 
used the corporation’s trademarks on the social networking sites.319  One of 
the accounts included a photograph of Jones and tweets under his name, 
which he had not authored.320  Jones’s affiliation on the account was also 
listed as “Full Sail.”321  Supposedly, there was a disclaimer on the account 
saying that the fake account was “‘obviously a parody.’”322  Based on these 
fraudulent accounts, the plaintiffs brought suit for several claims,323 one of 
which was for violation of California’s criminal impersonation statute.324 
Assuming that jurisdiction and other preliminary issues of procedure are 
appropriate, this cause of action may be successful under California’s law.325  
First, the defendants did knowingly impersonate Garry Jones without his 
 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
 316.  In California, she could also be fined up to $1000 in addition to or in instead of 
imprisonment.  See supra text accompanying note 86. 
 317.  Full Sail, Inc. operates Full Sail University, an education institution in Florida focusing on 
careers in the entertainment industry.  Complaint ¶¶ 8–9, Full Sail, Inc. v. Does, No. 3:11CV00325 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 336927 [hereinafter Full Sail Complaint]. 
 318.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. ¶¶ 23, 26. 
 321.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 322.  Id. ¶ 31. 
 323.  These claims included claims for trademark infringement, violations of federal trademark 
laws, and federal and state dilution laws.  Id. ¶¶ 43–51, 56–64.  Further claims were brought for 
misappropriation of name and likeness under California law.  Id. ¶¶ 52–55. 
 324.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011). 
 325.  See id. § 528.5(e) (“In addition to any other civil remedy available, a person who suffers 
damage or loss by reason of a violation of subdivision (a) may bring a civil action against the 
violator for compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief pursuant to 
paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision (e) and subdivision (g) of [s]ection 502.”). 
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consent.326  The impersonation took place by means of fake accounts on 
Twitter.327  Under California’s statute, guilt clearly extends to “opening . . . 
an account or profile on a social networking Internet Web site in another 
person’s name.”328  Second, the impersonation was also “credible” assuming 
the alleged facts are true—other Twitter users actually believed that the 
account was Jones’s and left comments for him on his account.329  Finally, 
the court will have to decide if the intent requirement is satisfied—whether 
the fake accounts were created “for purposes of harming, intimidating, 
threatening, or defrauding another person.”330  The complaint alleges that the 
fake accounts were meant to “injure Plaintiffs’ reputations, and to disparage 
the services they offer.”331  This would likely qualify as creating fake 
accounts for purposes of harming another person.  However, this is 
debatable because the disclaimer on the profile clearly stated that it was a 
parody.  If warning that something is in fact a parody eliminates any intent 
to otherwise “harm” another, then a civil cause of action under subsection 
(e) of the California statute would not be appropriate.332  However, if 
parodies can still be considered as harming another, then this suit for 
fraudulent Twitter accounts may be successful under California law.333 
Overall, modern penal codes suggest a trend toward criminalizing deceit 
on social networking sites.  Some laws, like California’s statute, explicitly 
allow for a civil cause of action.334  Pursuant to these laws, the prosecution 
or plaintiff would not have to establish any of the additional elements in 
cyberbullying laws requiring that the impersonation actually cause 
emotional distress.  This is one reason why states should adopt approaches 
like those in Texas and California.  These kinds of laws regulate online 
behavior and ensure that imposters and sexual predators cannot get away 
with abusing social networking sites based on technicalities of the law.  
Moreover, these laws are not overbroad or dangerous to free speech because 
guilt is limited to instances where the impersonation was made with the 
intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten another.335  Thus, if a person 
 
 326.  Full Sail Complaint, supra note 317, ¶¶ 23, 26. 
 327.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 328.  See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 329.  One Twitter user thanked Jones for the “‘opportunity to be at FullSailUniv.’”  Full Sail 
Complaint, supra note 317, ¶ 32.  Another user said, “‘Im [sic] in month #3 Mr. Jones and loving 
it.’”  Id.  A third person wrote, “‘thanks for the follow man!  Almost half way done with Full Sail 
and I love it, THANKS A LOT.’”  Id.  Finally, a fourth user said, “‘Excellent to see you on twitter, 
welcome to instant communication; and thanks for reaching out.  You rock!’”  Id. 
 330.  See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 331.  Full Sail Complaint, supra note 317, ¶ 25. 
 332.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(e) (West 2011). 
 333.  See id. 
 334.  See id. 
 335.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82, 85. 
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creates a fake profile for his or her own amusement without the requisite 
intent, no guilt attaches.  Another qualification is that the impersonation has 
to have been done without the consent of the person being impersonated.336  
In other words, it appears that a person would not be guilty under these laws 
if he impersonates another with that person’s consent to harm, defraud, 
intimidate, or threaten another.  California further limits criminal guilt by 
requiring the impersonation to be “credible.”337 
In light of these criminal laws and the fact that legislatures are 
beginning to respond to the effects of social networking sites, it is evident 
that these sites are playing an increasingly pervasive and vital role in 
facilitating communication and transactions in today’s information age.  
Thus, future litigation in the area of misrepresentation law is likely, and 
further constitutional considerations are warranted. 
IV.  THE FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING MISREPRESENTATION 
LAW TO MISREPRESENTATIONS ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
Regardless of whether current law would allow misrepresentation 
actions for lies on social networking sites, it is necessary to determine 
whether the use of misrepresentation law to regulate such deceit is 
constitutionally appropriate. 
A.  Does Regulating Online Behavior Hinder Free Speech Rights? 
The most important and obvious constitutional implication of regulating 
online statements is possible infringement on First Amendment free speech 
rights.  Future litigation in the area of free speech on social networking sites 
is particularly likely with student speech.338  As students continue to use 
 
 336.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82, 85. 
 337.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 338.  “Because students will continue to post reprehensible content to their web pages and engage 
in speech in other non-traditional forms and forums, questions will continue to arise as to whether 
and when administrators can reach beyond the school gates and prevent or punish such speech.”  
Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in the Age of the 
Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1162 (2008).  For an analysis of the constitutional issues concerning 
online student speech, see generally Calvert, supra note 252; Tova Wolking, School Administrators 
As Cyber Censors: Cyber Speech and First Amendment Rights, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1507 
(2008); Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School 
Jurisdiction Over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563 (2009); Carolyn Joyce Mattus, 
Comment, Is It Really My Space?: Public Schools and Student Speech on the Internet After 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District and Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 16 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 318 (2010); Caitlin May, Comment, “Internet-Savvy Students” and Bewildered 
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these sites, and in increasing numbers, they will continue to make false and 
disparaging comments about others online.339  In Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District, for example, a high school student claimed that his free 
speech rights were violated after he was suspended and banned from 
participating in the school’s graduation ceremony for creating a fake 
MySpace profile of his principal.340  The profile suggested that the principal 
was a “‘big steroid freak’” and “‘big whore’” who smoked a “‘big blunt’” 
and had a “‘big keg’” behind his desk.341  The profile also provided 
inappropriate and false statements in response to questions.342  The court 
found that this false and insulting student speech was in fact protected by the 
First Amendment because there was no nexus between the fake profile and a 
disruption of the school environment.343  Although the case was limited to 
the context of student speech, it emphasizes that people who use the Internet 
as a means for mockery and inaccurate statements will likely claim the 
statements are protected free speech.344  Thus, it is necessary to consider 
how important it is to shield these misrepresentations as protected First 
Amendment rights.345 
 
 
 
 
Educators: Student Internet Speech Is Creating New Legal Issues for the Educational Community, 
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105 (2009). 
 339.  In R.O. v. Parma City School District Board of Education, a middle school student sued, 
claiming that his free speech rights were violated after he was suspended for making a fake MySpace 
profile of his principal.  R.O. v. Parma City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:08CV0417 (N.D. Ohio 
Feb. 20, 2008).  The parody profile included a picture of the principal and a heading titled “Your 
Princeypal.”  Id.  Under the interests section, the principal’s interests were stated as “giving students 
anal” and “jacking off in my office.”  Id.  Further vulgar and inappropriate comments were made in 
other parts of the profile, listing the principal’s favorite movies as “gay porn” and his favorite 
television show as “boy meets dildo.”  Id.  The student also named Michael Jackson, Adolph Hitler, 
and Saddam Hussein as the principal’s heroes.  Id.  Other comments rudely suggested that the 
principal had sexual relations with the assistant principal.  Id.  Despite all of these shocking and lewd 
comments, the student still sued, arguing that his suspension violated his free speech rights.  Id.  In 
another case, students claimed that a YouTube video making disparaging and defamatory statements 
about a thirteen-year-old classmate was protected free speech.  J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills 
Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097–98 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  One of the students in the 
video called the classmate “‘a slut,’” “‘spoiled,’” and an “‘ugly piece of shit.’”  Id. at 1108.  The 
court found that the school’s disciplinary actions against the maker of the video violated the 
student’s First Amendment rights because the video did not substantially disrupt school activities.  
Id. at 1116, 1123. 
 340.  Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591–94 (W.D. Pa. 
2007), aff’d on reh’g, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 341.  Id. at 591. 
 342.  Id.  “In response to the question, ‘ever been beaten up?,’ the profile [said] ‘big fag,’” and in 
response to, “‘in the past month have you gone on a date?,’” the profile said “‘big hard-on.’”  Id. 
 343.  Id. at 600–01. 
 344.  See id. 
 345.  See Balkin, supra note 212, at 427. 
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According to a Yale Law School First Amendment scholar, Jack Balkin: 
The key values that underlie the First Amendment seem as 
important as ever: the protection of individual freedom to express 
ideas, form opinions, create art, and engage in research; the ability 
of individuals and groups to share their views with others, and build 
on the ideas of others; and the promotion and dissemination of 
knowledge and opinion.346 
Balkin has compared the modern world of social networking sites, blogs, 
and search engines to the Enlightenment Era and has emphasized that First 
Amendment values remain just as important today as they did during the 
Enlightenment.347  As such, “the most important decisions affecting the 
future of freedom of speech [related to the Internet] will not occur in 
constitutional law;” they will be decisions about regulatory issues.348  Thus, 
in ensuring justice by providing a remedy for malicious and dangerous lies, 
it is equally important to balance regulatory interests with valid free speech 
interests.349 
On the free speech side of the balancing test, there are clear reasons to 
protect false speech.  The main reason to protect false statements made 
online is because “[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some 
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”350  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. is instructive on this point.351  The 
Court emphasized that there should be more protection for false ideas or 
opinions than for false factual statements.352  Where the deception involves 
an idea or opinion, the “correction” depends “not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”353  False statements 
of fact, however, do not deserve the same level of protection because “there 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact”—“[n]either the 
 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id.  Other important decisions affecting the future of free speech in today’s technological 
context are decisions about technological designs, the formation of new business models, and the 
activities of online users.  Id. 
 349.  See id. at 432.  “By choosing a regulatory scheme that lets the Internet function more or less 
as a general data transport system, we open up possibilities for a wide variety of new applications 
and services that can let people share information and opinions, build things together, and form 
online communities.”  Id. 
 350.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). 
 351.  See id. 
 352.  See id. at 339–40. 
 353.  Id. 
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intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in 
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”354  Thus, the 
extent of protection for false statements on social networking sites should 
take into consideration whether the speech is a statement of opinion or a 
false factual statement.355 
Certainly, allowing misrepresentation suits for online deceit stifles 
speech.  The possibility of a lawsuit will likely prevent online speakers from 
making certain statements out of fear that they might be subject to liability 
for assertions they did not know were incorrect.  Despite these concerns, 
“today’s networked environment warrants a rejection of free-speech 
absolutism.”356  Moreover, misrepresentation law is still a practical and 
necessary means for regulating abusive online behavior.357  Thus, the 
application of misrepresentation law should be limited in such a way that it 
does not infringe on more speech than is necessary.358  For example, it is 
probably inappropriate to suppress speech that is merely negligent, rather 
than intentionally fraudulent, just to provide a remedy to an injured 
plaintiff.359  In these instances, the balance should weigh in favor of free 
speech rather than regulatory interests.360  Moreover, free speech interests 
should be protected by limiting recovery according to the moral 
reprehensibility of the lie—a totality of the circumstances consideration.361  
Because not all lies involve the same level of moral depravity, a legal 
remedy through misrepresentation law should depend on the nefarious 
qualities of the lie.  It is more appropriate to find civil or criminal liability 
 
 354.  Id. at 340. 
 355.  The First Amendment does not protect “statements of fact (express or implied) that are 
clearly and convincingly proven in a judicial proceeding subject to independent appellate review to 
be known by the speaker to be false, or even consciously thought to be probably false but recklessly 
uttered anyway.”  Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1112–13 (2006). 
 356.  Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 97 (2009). 
 357.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 358.  See Balkin, supra note 212, at 442.  “Free speech values increasingly depend on . . . 
regulatory decisions that keep the Internet open, either by limiting liability . . . or by discouraging 
anticompetitive behavior . . . .”  Id. 
 359.  See Strong, supra note 59, at 118 (arguing that “[c]ourts must strike a balance between the 
value of shared information (particularly regarding physical safety) and the value of holding people 
accountable for negligently inaccurate speech about such risks”). 
 360.  See id. 
 361.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  The Ninth Circuit has cautioned against 
criminalizing all misrepresentations online because of free speech implications.  See United States v. 
Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (“All previous circumstances in which lies have been 
found proscribable involve not just knowing falsity, but additional elements that serve to narrow 
what speech may be punished.  Indeed [if any lie could be punished] . . . then there would be no 
constitutional bar to criminalizing lying about one’s height, weight, age, or financial status on 
Match.com or Facebook, or falsely representing to one’s mother that one does not smoke, drink 
alcoholic beverages, is a virgin, or has not exceeded the speed limit while driving on the freeway.  
The sad fact is, most people lie about some aspects of their lives from time to time.”). 
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when the lie on a social networking site is egregious and outrageously 
harmful than when it is a simple white lie.362  In this way, a court can 
prevent frivolous lawsuits while also ensuring a remedy for a plaintiff 
injured by a baseless and damaging lie.363  With these free speech 
considerations in mind, it is important to consider whether misrepresentation 
law is even necessary to regulate fraud on social networking sites. 
B.   Is Misrepresentation Law Necessary to Manage Fraud on Social 
Networks? 
One important reason that misrepresentation law should be considered 
an appropriate cause of action for social networking lies is because people 
generally cannot recover from the social networking sites themselves, which 
remain immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act.364  
Under the Communications Decency Act, “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”365  This 
means that broadband companies and social networking sites are not liable 
for what other people say on those sites, no matter how damaging or even 
deadly.366  Thus, a plaintiff injured by a social networking lie would be left 
without a remedy if he could not bring a misrepresentation cause of action 
against the maker of the misrepresentation.367  To curb abuse of the 
anonymous nature of online communications and circumvent the immunity 
of social networking sites, misrepresentation law is an appropriate 
mechanism for regulating behavior on social networking sites.368 
 
 362.  Although many white lies may be baseless and intentional, it “does not lie within the power 
of any judicial system . . . to remedy all human wrongs.”  Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 
619 (Ct. App. 1980).  Wrongs like “brutal words . . . are beyond any effective legal remedy and any 
practical administration of law.”  Id.  In fact, “[t]o attempt to correct such wrongs or give relief from 
their effects ‘may do more social damage than if the law leaves them alone.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 363.  See id. 
 364.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 365.  Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 366.  See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant was 
not liable for the illegal videos posted by one of its users); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that AOL was not liable for the defamatory statements made by 
one of its users). 
 367.  See Daniel H. Kahn, Social Intermediaries: Creating a More Responsible Web Through 
Portable Identity, Cross-Web Reputation, and Code-Backed Norms, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 176 (2010). 
 368.  See id. 
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Misrepresentation law is further necessary to create a more responsible 
and safe online community.369  “[B]ecause of the Web’s structural 
limitations on identity, norm-based social governance has not played a 
significant role on most sites.”370  Rather, the lack of norms “has created an 
atmosphere in which abusive behavior is common, heightening the apparent 
need for new legal regulation.”371  Allowing misrepresentation actions for 
deceit on social networking sites is one essential way of regulating abusive 
online behavior.372  More importantly, applying misrepresentation law to 
social networking sites will strengthen torts in general as a means of 
controlling cyberspace in the information age.373  As courts start to deal with 
future litigation involving social networking misrepresentations, they should 
be open to applying misrepresentation law as a regulatory mechanism on a 
case-by-case basis.374 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Misrepresentations come in many different forms—some are harmless, 
while others are life threatening and emotionally distressing.  With the 
increasing popularity of social networking sites, people are able to 
disseminate false information and lie to wider audiences.  Unfortunately, 
cyberspace governance has not kept up with the modern implications of 
social networking.  Thus, courts should refine their approach to 
misrepresentation law in order to adequately regulate online deceit.  In 
future litigation involving social networking sites, the application of 
misrepresentation law will necessarily depend on the lie at issue.  Courts 
should be more willing to allow a cause of action where the deceit is 
intentional and outrageous.  Essentially, a balancing test, which takes into 
consideration a totality of the circumstances and the free speech implications 
 
 369.  See id. 
 370.  Id. at 176. 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  See id. (suggesting that social intermediaries allow “users to aggregate records of their 
activities across multiple sites,” which therefore could help to prevent abusive online behavior by 
allowing “many more sites to offer opportunities for users to govern each other through code-backed 
norms”). 
 373.  One potential problem in applying misrepresentation law, however, involves the lack of 
territorial borders in a cyber-world—making the regulation of online behavior much more difficult.  
See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996) (arguing that the absence of territorial borders in cyberspace subverts 
“(1) the power of local governments to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects of online 
behavior on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign’s efforts to regulate global 
phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which sets of rules apply”); see 
also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD (2006) (admitting that the Internet might change some things about the authority of the 
nation-state, but arguing that it will not change the fundamental role of governments). 
 374.  See supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
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of regulating online representations, would ensure that online fraud does not 
go unpunished any longer. 
Geelan Fahimy* 
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